Freeze jEUR on Aave v3 Polygon
01Summary
Emergency governance proposal to temporarily freeze jEUR on Aave v3 Polygon following a Midas Protocol exploit that affected 5-10% of jEUR supply and collateralization.
- Type
- protocol deprecation
Key changes
- Freeze jEUR reserve on Aave v3 Polygon via setReserveFreeze() execution on PoolConfigurator(high)
- Response to Midas Protocol exploit affecting jEUR collateralization and 5-10% of jEUR supply(high)
Notable concerns
- jEUR collateralization impacted by external Midas Protocol exploit
- 5-10% of jEUR supply affected by the exploit
- Cross-chain governance proposal for Polygon network
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Simple Summary
Following the exploit on Midas Protocol, slightly affecting the collateralization of jEUR, this proposal temporarily freezes jEUR.
Motivation
It is important for the community to decide if a freezing should be executed, for caution, given that a meaningful amount of the jEUR supply (5-10%) seems to be affected.
Specification
This is a cross-chain governance proposal for Aave v3 Polygon.
The proposal payload simply executes setReserveFreeze() on the Aave v3 Polygon PoolConfigurator for jEUR.
References
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal describes a single cross-chain governance action: executing a specific payload contract on Polygon that calls setReserveFreeze() for jEUR. The decoded calldata shows exactly one action — an execute(address) call targeting 0x165e90Bd0a41d08fA1891CcDCEe315D7b83B3419 — which matches the 'Deployed payload' address explicitly linked in the proposal's References section. Since Aave cross-chain governance proposals typically bundle payload logic into a single executor contract call, and the target address matches the cited payload exactly, the on-chain action is consistent with the described intent. We cannot independently decode the payload's internal logic (it's opaque as a single execute() call), but the address match combined with the described 'simply executes setReserveFreeze()' framing gives no indication of a mismatch. The test file name references both jEUR and agEUR, which could hint the payload governs both reserves, but this is not verifiable from the calldata alone and doesn't constitute a clear discrepancy — it may simply be a shared test suite name. No value, target, or scope mismatches were found between the prose and the decoded action.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x158a…d45b
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- execute(address)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0x165e90Bd0a41d08fA1891CcDCEe315D7b83B3419" }- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.
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