Chaos Labs V2 to V3 Migration Next Steps
01Summary
Freeze six mid-cap token reserves (1INCH, ENS, LINK, MKR, SNX, UNI) on Aave V2 Ethereum to reduce risk exposure and encourage migration to V3, which offers superior risk management capabilities.
- Type
- protocol deprecation
Key changes
- Freeze 1INCH reserve on Aave V2 Ethereum using freezeReserve() method(high)
- Freeze ENS reserve on Aave V2 Ethereum using freezeReserve() method(high)
- Freeze LINK reserve on Aave V2 Ethereum using freezeReserve() method(high)
- Freeze MKR reserve on Aave V2 Ethereum using freezeReserve() method(high)
- Freeze SNX reserve on Aave V2 Ethereum using freezeReserve() method(high)
- Freeze UNI reserve on Aave V2 Ethereum using freezeReserve() method(high)
Notable concerns
- Users will be unable to supply or interact with these assets on V2, though V3 alternatives are available
- Freeze does not prevent existing V2 positions from being managed, only prevents new deposits
- Risk management strategy to prevent V2 overexposure similar to CRV situation
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Simple Summary
This AIP proposes to Freeze the the 1INCH, ENS, LINK, MKR, SNX & UNI reserves on the Aave V2 Ethereum pool
Motivation
Following the successful deployment of Aave V3 on the Ethereum network, we propose a reassessment of smaller-to-medium capitalization tokens. Unlike CRV (we will soon contribute further insights on this topic, as the complexity of the CRV market, primarily due to its substantial scale, warrants a more nuanced examination), these markets exhibit a more modest size and generally can be conveniently migrated. This diverges from preceding deliberations on market freezes prior to the V3 launch. With V3 live, invoking a freeze on V2 markets does not preclude users from capitalizing on these markets. Instead, it enhances the community’s capacity to safeguard user funds more effectively, as V3’s advanced risk management mechanisms provide a more secure environment. This proactive strategy aims to enforce a freeze on low-to-medium capital assets on V2, thereby averting a scenario resembling Aave V2’s current overexposure to CRV while permitting users to engage with Aave via V3 markets.
Specification
This AIP will call freezeReserve() method from the Aave V2 Pool Configurator contract for the following assets: 1INCH, ENS, LINK, MKR, SNX & UNI
contract AaveV2FreezeReserves_20230619 is IProposalGenericExecutor {
address public constant ONEINCH = AaveV2EthereumAssets.ONE_INCH_UNDERLYING;
address public constant ENS = AaveV2EthereumAssets.ENS_UNDERLYING;
address public constant LINK = AaveV2EthereumAssets.LINK_UNDERLYING;
address public constant MKR = AaveV2EthereumAssets.MKR_UNDERLYING;
address public constant SNX = AaveV2EthereumAssets.SNX_UNDERLYING;
address public constant UNI = AaveV2EthereumAssets.UNI_UNDERLYING;
function execute() external {
AaveV2Ethereum.POOL_CONFIGURATOR.freezeReserve(ONEINCH);
AaveV2Ethereum.POOL_CONFIGURATOR.freezeReserve(ENS);
AaveV2Ethereum.POOL_CONFIGURATOR.freezeReserve(LINK);
AaveV2Ethereum.POOL_CONFIGURATOR.freezeReserve(MKR);
AaveV2Ethereum.POOL_CONFIGURATOR.freezeReserve(SNX);
AaveV2Ethereum.POOL_CONFIGURATOR.freezeReserve(UNI);
}
}
References
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal follows the standard Aave governance pattern where a single on-chain action invokes execute() on a dedicated payload/executor contract (0xc1a6...a306f) rather than encoding each individual call in the governance calldata. The referenced Solidity source (AaveV2FreezeReserves_20230619.sol) shows that this execute() function performs exactly six freezeReserve() calls to the Pool Configurator for the six assets named in the description (1INCH, ENS, LINK, MKR, SNX, UNI) — matching the prose exactly in scope, targets, and asset list. There is no value transfer, no additional hidden calls, and no numeric parameters to mismatch (freezeReserve takes only an address, no percentage or threshold to compare). Because the decoded calldata itself only shows a single opaque execute() call, I cannot cryptographically verify the internal six calls from the on-chain action row alone, which is why confidence is medium rather than high. However, this is the well-established pattern for Aave governance payloads, and the referenced code is transparent and consistent with the description's claims. No value, target, or scope discrepancies are apparent.},
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0xc1a6…306f
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- fallback()
- Arguments
{}- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.
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