Allow Emergency Admin to freeze on Aave V2

The proposal uses the standard Aave cross-chain governance pattern: the top-level calldata only calls forwardPayloadForExecution() on the CrossChainController, referencing opaque payload IDs per chain rather than directly encoding freezeReserve/setLendingPoolConfiguratorImpl calls. The actual logic (new pool configurator implementation, LendingPoolCollateralManager update, Liquidations Grace Sentinel activation) lives in the separately deployed and linked Payload contracts, which are not visible in this decoded calldata. Structurally, the count and target chains line up well with the description: three payloads forwarded to chain 1 (plausibly covering AaveV2Ethereum pool configurator, AaveV2EthereumAMM pool configurator, and the AMM LendingPoolCollateralManager/Sentinel update), one payload to chain 137 (Polygon) and one to chain 43114 (Avalanche), matching the four V2 markets plus the extra AMM-specific action mentioned in the description. Because the payload contents themselves cannot be verified from this calldata alone (only IDs and executor addresses are visible), exact confirmation of 'freezeReserve modifier' and 'Sentinel' details is not possible, lowering confidence to medium. However, there is no evidence of target mismatches, extra unexplained actions, or omitted major functionality — the structure is consistent with the narrative given. No discrepancies were found significant enough to flag given the standard bridging pattern used by Aave governance for multi-chain payloads.