KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governor v2 · #358

Disable Stable Borrows

executedNov 8, 2023, 03:17 PM UTCbyF70xf71f…1e02

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

This proposal permanently disables stable rate borrowing across all Aave pools on all networks (Ethereum v2, Polygon, Avalanche, Optimism, and Arbitrum v3) and unfreezes assets that were previously frozen as an emergency response to a reported attack vector.

Type
protocol deprecation

Key changes

  • Disable stable borrow rate for all assets on v3 pools across multiple networks (Polygon, Avalanche, Optimism, Arbitrum)(high)
  • Disable stable rate on Ethereum v2 pool(high)
  • Unfreeze all assets previously frozen as risk mitigation in response to reported attack vector(high)

Notable concerns

  • Proposal removes stable rate borrowing functionality permanently across all networks, which may impact users with existing stable rate positions
  • Emergency freeze action was triggered by a reported white-hat attack vector, indicating a security vulnerability was discovered and mitigated
ContractsPOOL_CONFIGURATOR on Ethereum v2POOL_CONFIGURATOR on Polygon v3POOL_CONFIGURATOR on Avalanche v3POOL_CONFIGURATOR on Optimism v3POOL_CONFIGURATOR on Arbitrum v3
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Read the description ↗

02Description

141 words

Simple Summary

This proposal disables stable borrow rate for all assets across all pools on all networks. In addition, it unfreezes assets that were previously frozen by the freeze steward.

Motivation

In response to an attack vector reported by a white-hat, some immediate steps where taken to protect the Aave Markets by pausing and freezing the affected markets. This proposal will revert the freezings and apply a permanent fix. Un-pausing the applicable pools will be done via Guardian.

Specification

The proposal calls

  • POOL_CONFIGURATOR.setReserveStableRateBorrowing(asset, false); for all assets with stable borrowing enabled on v3 pools,
  • POOL_CONFIGURATOR.disableReserveStableRate(asset); for Ethereum v2 pool, and
  • POOL_CONFIGURATOR.unfreeze(asset) with all assets previously frozen as risk mitigation measure.

References

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorummedium confidenceclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The decoded actions consist of five identical-shaped calls to a cross-chain controller (forwardPayloadForExecution), each targeting a distinct chain ID: 1 (Ethereum), 137 (Polygon), 43114 (Avalanche), 10 (Optimism), and 42161 (Arbitrum). This exactly matches the five networks named in the proposal's References section (AaveV2Ethereum, AaveV3Polygon, AaveV3Avalanche, AaveV3Optimism, AaveV3Arbitrum), and aligns with the high-level narrative of disabling stable borrowing and unfreezing assets across all networks. However, the actual low-level function calls described in the Specification (setReserveStableRateBorrowing, disableReserveStableRate, unfreeze) are not visible in this decoding — they are presumably encoded inside the forwarded payloads, which are not expanded here. Because the top-level structure (chain coverage, target contract, forwarding mechanism) is fully consistent with the description and there is no evidence of a mismatched target, missing action, or altered value, I find no discrepancy. Confidence is set to medium rather than high because the specific pool-configurator calls inside each payload cannot be independently verified from the given calldata.'

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

5 total
#0forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))chain 0x1
Target
0x9aee…2bc7
Value
0 wei
Function
forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))
Arguments
{
  "0": [
    "1",
    "1",
    "0xdAbad81aF85554E9ae636395611C58F7eC1aAEc5",
    "4"
  ]
}
Calldata
#1forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))chain 0x1
Target
0x9aee…2bc7
Value
0 wei
Function
forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))
Arguments
{
  "0": [
    "137",
    "1",
    "0x401B5D0294E23637c18fcc38b1Bca814CDa2637C",
    "0"
  ]
}
Calldata
#2forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))chain 0x1
Target
0x9aee…2bc7
Value
0 wei
Function
forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))
Arguments
{
  "0": [
    "43114",
    "1",
    "0x1140CB7CAfAcC745771C2Ea31e7B5C653c5d0B80",
    "0"
  ]
}
Calldata
#3forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))chain 0x1
Target
0x9aee…2bc7
Value
0 wei
Function
forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))
Arguments
{
  "0": [
    "10",
    "1",
    "0x0E1a3Af1f9cC76A62eD31eDedca291E63632e7c4",
    "0"
  ]
}
Calldata
#4forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))chain 0x1
Target
0x9aee…2bc7
Value
0 wei
Function
forwardPayloadForExecution((uint256,uint8,address,uint40))
Arguments
{
  "0": [
    "42161",
    "1",
    "0x89644CA1bB8064760312AE4F03ea41b05dA3637C",
    "0"
  ]
}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters31
VP participating521.6K
Outcome (current)For
Current support100%

06Voters

31 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.