KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governor v2 · #132

Freeze Aave V1

executedDec 23, 2022, 04:41 AM UTCbyF70xf71f…1e02

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

This proposal freezes all reserves on Aave Ethereum v1 and Aave Ethereum AMM v1 pools as part of the planned v1 sunset. After this change, users can still repay and withdraw existing positions, but cannot supply new funds or borrow. This continues the community's gradual deprecation of v1 following the deployment of v2 (December 2020) and v3.

Type
protocol deprecation

Key changes

  • Freeze all reserves on Aave Ethereum v1 LendingPool(high)
  • Freeze all reserves on Aave Ethereum AMM v1 LendingPool(high)
  • Users can still repay and withdraw but cannot supply or borrow on frozen reserves(high)

Notable concerns

  • This is a deprecation step that restricts functionality on v1 pools; users with active positions should plan to migrate to v2 or v3
Contracts0x24a42fD28C976A61Df5D00D0599C34c4f90748c80x7fd53085B9A29D236235D6FC593b47C9C33429F10x6f02253c80a041a773efa35c98d4bc14a0f6ef9e
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Read the description ↗

02Description

231 words

Simple Summary

This proposal will perform the next step in sunsetting Aave v1 by freezing all reserves on the Aave Ethereum v1 and Aave Ethereum Amm V1 pool.

Motivation

Aave V1 was deployed on the Ethereum network back in January 2020, being the first step of everything that would come afterward on the Aave ecosystem. Since then, countless developments happened in the community, amongst them, 2 more iterations of the protocol: Aave v2 and Aave v3. After the deployment of Aave v2 Ethereum, almost 2 years ago (December 2020), the general approach of the community was to progressively sunset Aave v1, with steps like enabling a migration tool v1 → v2 and disabling stable borrowing on v1 (more information here). Therefore the next step that was decided upon in this snapshot vote is to freeze all the v1 reserves. With this change in place, users can still repay & withdraw, but no longer supply and borrow.

Specification

The proposal fetches the LendingPoolCore and LendingPoolConfigurator from the respective Aave ethereum and Aave ethereum amm LendingPoolAddressesProviders via getLendingPoolCore() & getLendingPoolConfigurator(). As the next step it fetches all reserves via lendingPoolCore.getReserves() and freezes them one by one, by iterating though the list and calling lendingPoolConfigurator.freezeReserve(reserve).

References

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorumclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The proposal uses the standard Aave governance pattern of executing a single payload contract via execute(), which internally performs the multi-step logic (fetching LendingPoolCore/Configurator, iterating reserves, calling freezeReserve). The decoded calldata shows exactly one action: a call to execute() on 0x6f02253c80a041a773efa35c98d4bc14a0f6ef9e, which matches precisely the 'Deployed implementation' address cited in the proposal's References section. Since the on-chain action target matches the described payload contract and the description accurately summarizes what that payload contract is documented (and linked via source code and test suite) to do, there is no target mismatch, value mismatch, or omitted action. The lack of granular sub-calls in the decoded data is expected because the underlying logic is executed via delegatecall inside the payload contract itself, not exposed as separate top-level proposal actions. This is a routine, legitimate summarization of a single, well-documented action. No discrepancies were found between the prose and the calldata.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

1 total
#0fallback()chain 0x1
Target
0x6f02…ef9e
Value
0 wei
Function
fallback()
Arguments
{}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters95
VP participating595.4K
Outcome (current)For
Current support100%

06Voters

95 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

AIForum synthesis by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5
sentiment · favorablethread · constructive

Arguments for

  • Freezing Aave V1 reduces ongoing maintenance overhead and tail costs for the DAO, including security monitoring, legacy UI maintenance, and concentrated personnel expertise.— bgdlabs, Kene_Anode
  • V1 has been progressively deprecated in favor of V2 and V3 with sufficient migration tools available, making it an appropriate time to sunset the protocol.— bgdlabs
  • Users are not negatively impacted by freezing since they can still repay and withdraw funds, and those needing to refill collateral can simply migrate to V2.— bgdlabs
  • V1 AMM pools are particularly small (~$280k) and use deprecated Uniswap V1 collateral, making them clear candidates for freezing.— bgdlabs

Arguments against

None surfaced.

Unresolved concerns

  • What is the actual quantified cost to Aave of maintaining V1, and would those savings justify the freeze?— Kene_Anode, bgdlabs
  • Clarification on which user types are still using V1 (smart contract wallets, bots, arbitrageurs) and whether they would face friction.— Nandy.eth

Notable participants

  • bgdlabsProposal initiator from the BGD Labs engagement, providing technical context and fielding community questions.
  • VonNeumannSecurity-conscious contributor who raised audit concerns and ultimately expressed support.
  • Nandy.ethEarly questioner seeking clarity on user impact and the identity of remaining V1 users.
  • EzR3aLIdentified weekend timing as reason for first proposal failure and advocated for resubmission.
  • MarcZellerConfirmed historical voting challenges on weekends and supported resubmission with improved timing.
  • Kene_AnodeExpressed support while requesting quantified maintenance cost data.
  • figPledged organizational support for resubmission with improved vote timing.
  • G-BlockchainSupported resubmission, citing that weekend timing caused them to miss the initial vote.
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Open the thread ↗