Borrow Caps for Compound V2 Assets
01Summary
Proposal to adjust borrow caps (a risk parameter) for 10 Compound V2 assets based on Gauntlet's risk analysis recommendations. The changes aim to maintain protocol risk tolerance while optimizing for insolvencies, liquidations, and borrow usage.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Borrow cap adjustments for 10 Compound V2 assets with specified new limit values ranging from 20 to 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 wei units(high)
Notable concerns
- Proposal relies on external risk modeling from Gauntlet; token holders should review Gauntlet's Parameter Recommendation Methodology to understand the optimization function
- Multiple assets have different borrow cap adjustments; impact varies by asset
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Borrow Caps for Compound V2 Assets
Simple Summary
A proposal to adjust ten (10) risk parameters (borrow caps) for ten (10) Compound V2 assets.
Background
Gauntlet's simulation engine has ingested the latest market and liquidity data. These recommendations are Gauntlet's regular parameter recommendations as part of Dynamic Risk Parameters.
Full proposal and forum discussion
Motivation and Specification
This set of parameter updates seeks to maintain the overall risk tolerance of the protocol while making risk trade-offs between specific assets.
Our parameter recommendations are driven by an optimization function that balances 3 core metrics: insolvencies, liquidations, and borrow usage. Our parameter recommendations seek to optimize for this objective function. For more details, please see Gauntlet's Parameter Recommendation Methodology and Gauntlet's Model Methodology.

By approving this proposal, you agree that any services provided by Gauntlet shall be governed by the terms of service available at gauntlet.network/tos.
03Mismatch analysis
The description states the proposal adjusts borrow caps for exactly ten Compound V2 assets via Gauntlet's standard risk-parameter process. The single decoded action calls _setMarketBorrowCaps with arrays of exactly 10 addresses and 10 corresponding cap values, targeting the Comptroller contract — this matches the described scope in both count and mechanism. The description does not specify individual asset addresses or exact cap values, so there is nothing granular to cross-check for value or target mismatches, but the high-level claim (10 assets, borrow cap adjustment, single governance action) is fully consistent with the calldata. No omitted, extra, or misleading elements were found. This is a routine, well-documented Gauntlet parameter update matching its typical historical pattern, so confidence in the assessment is high despite the description lacking asset-level detail.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x3d98…cd3b
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- _setMarketBorrowCaps(address[],uint256[])
- Arguments
{ "0": [ "0xccF4429DB6322D5C611ee964527D42E5d685DD6a", "0x6C8c6b02E7b2BE14d4fA6022Dfd6d75921D90E4E", "0x35A18000230DA775CAc24873d00Ff85BccdeD550", "0x70e36f6BF80a52b3B46b3aF8e106CC0ed743E8e4", "0xFAce851a4921ce59e912d19329929CE6da6EB0c7", "0x4B0181102A0112A2ef11AbEE5563bb4a3176c9d7", "0xB3319f5D18Bc0D84dD1b4825Dcde5d5f7266d407", "0xe65cdB6479BaC1e22340E4E755fAE7E509EcD06c", "0x80a2AE356fc9ef4305676f7a3E2Ed04e12C33946", "0x95b4eF2869eBD94BEb4eEE400a99824BF5DC325b" ], "1": [ "1250000000000000000000", "900000000000000000000000", "550000000000000000000000", "18000000000000000000000", "45000000000000000000000", "750000000000000000000000", "1000000000000000000000000", "12000000000000000000000", "20000000000000000000", "300000000000000000000" ] }- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
- Risk Parameter Updates 2022-11-23 ↗discourse · high confidence
- Dynamic Risk Parameters ↗discourse · high confidence
Arguments for
- Borrow caps immediately protect the protocol from tail risks including insolvency from liquidation cascades, price manipulation exploits like "Mango squeeze", high utilization impairing liquidations, and outsized shorting risk.— pauljlei
- The proposed caps allow sufficient organic borrowing demand (e.g., USDC, DAI, USDT caps are 2x current borrow amounts) while limiting risk on collateral assets, striking a sensible balance particularly after Aave's CRV bad debt.— pauljlei, rleshner
- Borrow caps on non-stablecoin collateral assets are reasonable since stablecoins represent >96% of actual borrowing and can remain uncapped, making this a measured approach.— rleshner
- The proposal provides an immediate, implementable risk mitigation tool without requiring development of untested alternatives like modified interest rate curves.— pauljlei
Arguments against
- Hard borrow caps will cause major borrowers like Morpho Labs to deactivate their peer-to-peer matching engine on Compound, causing volume migration to Aave and reducing protocol relevance and fee generation.— PaulFrambot, 0x_vd
- Borrow caps are unnecessarily restrictive when alternative mechanisms like improved interest rate models with liquidity dimensions could achieve risk goals while preserving utility and capital efficiency.— PaulFrambot, VonNeumann2022, 0x_vd
- Gauntlet's recommendation lacks transparency and quantified justification for specific cap values, asking the community to blindly trust black-box simulations rather than explaining the methodology and reasoning.— PaulFrambot, VonNeumann2022
- The proposal was rushed with insufficient discussion time before voting, preventing the community from conducting proper due diligence on such a significant structural change.— PaulFrambot, VonNeumann2022
Unresolved concerns
- No quantified data on the actual opportunity cost and volume loss that borrow caps will impose on Compound versus the risk reduction gained.— PaulFrambot
- Unclear why Morpho Labs would need to deactivate P2P matching with borrow caps in place, given the hedging mechanism details were not fully explained.— OneTrueKirk
- Whether Compound governance should prioritize risk reduction equally with protocol utility and adoption, or if the balance struck favors one too heavily.— PaulFrambot, rleshner
- The fairness and effectiveness of governance when one entity (Gauntlet) holds significant voting power (126k+ votes) relative to other stakeholders who disagree.— ClairvoyantLabs
Notable participants
- pauljleiGauntlet proposer who authored the borrow caps proposal and defended it against community objections.
- PaulFrambotMorpho Labs representative who raised primary concerns about protocol utility loss and lack of transparency in Gauntlet's methodology.
- rleshnerCommunity leader who endorsed the proposal as striking the right balance by limiting caps to non-stablecoin collateral assets.
- VonNeumann2022Community member skeptical of black-box simulations who initially opposed but later reconsidered after rleshner's clarification.
- OneTrueKirkCommunity participant who sought clarification on Morpho's specific concerns about P2P matching and supported the stablecoin lending perspective.
- 0x_vdDefiEdge representative who briefly noted caps could limit borrowing and suggested alternative risk mechanisms.
- ClairvoyantLabsObserver who raised concerns about governance fairness and voting power concentration.
- monet-supplyCommunity member supporting the proposal and suggesting periodic review procedures for caps.
Generated by Kvorum
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