The on-chain calldata consists of two execute(address) calls that forward execution to bridge executor contracts, targeting two payload addresses. These target addresses (0x060Bea15AF594FE9e0A243cA632F2C7D1935C70f for Polygon and 0x280e404338d9d8e50B11D6677B9C91BA86E0FD22 for Arbitrum) exactly match the 'Deployed proposal payload' links explicitly cited in the proposal description for Polygon and Arbitrum respectively. This is the standard Aave cross-chain governance pattern where the top-level proposal simply triggers execution of chain-specific payload contracts that contain the actual risk parameter updates (supply/borrow caps for BAL, EURS, DAI, USDC, USDT, LINK, ETH). Because the decoded calldata only shows the outer execute() calls and not the internal logic of the payload contracts, I cannot directly verify each of the eleven specific cap values inside the payloads from this data alone. However, the addresses align precisely with what the description claims, and this pattern (execute() to a verified payload address matching the disclosed contract) is the expected, non-deceptive structure for these proposals. No mismatches, omissions, or extra actions are apparent given the information available, so I rate this consistent with medium confidence due to the inability to fully decode the nested payload logic from the provided data.