Risk Parameter Updates for Aave V3 ETH and V3 Arbitrum (2023-03-27)
01Summary
Proposal to adjust supply caps for three assets across Aave V3 on Ethereum and Arbitrum: increase WETH supply cap on Arbitrum from 35,280 to 45,000, increase rETH supply cap on Ethereum from 10,000 to 20,000, and decrease CRV supply cap on Ethereum from 62,500,000 to 51,000,000. Based on Gauntlet's cap methodology.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Increase WETH supply cap on V3 Arbitrum from 35,280 to 45,000(medium)
- Increase rETH supply cap on V3 Ethereum from 10,000 to 20,000(medium)
- Decrease CRV supply cap on V3 Ethereum from 62,500,000 to 51,000,000(medium)
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Summary
A proposal to make parameter changes on Aave V3 ETH and V3 Arbitrum. For more details, please refer to this forum post and Gauntlet's methodology for borrow and supply caps.
Specification
V3 Arbitrum:
- Increase WETH’s Supply Cap from 35,280 to 45,000
V3 ETH:
- Increase rETH’s Supply Cap from 10,000 to 20,000
- Decrease CRV's Supply Cap from 62,500,000 to 51,000,000
Implementation
The proposal implements supply cap updates through two pre-deployed payloads, one for Ethereum and the other for Arbitrum:
- Ethereum Payload:
0x142DCAEC322aAA25141B2597bf348487aDBd596d - Arbitrum Payload:
0x4c68fDA91bfb4683eAB90017d9B76a99F2d77Eed
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
By approving this proposal, you agree that any services provided by Gauntlet shall be governed by the terms of service available at gauntlet.network/tos. This message is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell, a solicitation to buy, or a recommendation for any security, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services by Gauntlet Networks Inc. No reference to any specific security constitutes a recommendation to buy, sell or hold that security or any other security. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors. Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal claims two pre-deployed payloads will be executed: one on Ethereum (0x142DCAEC...) and one on Arbitrum (0x4c68fDA9...). The decoded calldata shows action 0 directly calling the Ethereum payload address exactly as named, and action 1 calling a cross-chain execute(address) function on Ethereum that passes the exact Arbitrum payload address as its argument — this is the standard Aave cross-chain governance bridge pattern (BGD/Aave cross-chain controller) used to trigger execution of an Arbitrum-deployed payload from an Ethereum-based proposal, so both target addresses align correctly with the description's Implementation section, with no target_mismatch. The specific numeric supply-cap parameters (WETH 35,280→45,000, rETH 10,000→20,000, CRV 62,500,000→51,000,000) are not visible in the decoded top-level actions since they are encoded inside the separately deployed and presumably separately audited payload contracts (fallback()/execute() calls with no further parameter decoding) — this is routine and expected for Aave's payload-based governance pattern, not evidence of a mismatch, but it does mean the exact figures cannot be independently verified from calldata alone, which is why confidence is medium rather than high. No omitted, extra, or mismatched actions are apparent between the description and the two decoded actions.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x142d…596d
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- fallback()
- Arguments
{}- Calldata
- Target
- 0x2e2b…05f1
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- execute(address)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0x4c68fDA91bfb4683eAB90017d9B76a99F2d77Eed" }- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.
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