KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governor v2 · #170

Supply/Borrow Cap Updates V3 Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon

executedMar 10, 2023, 08:20 AM UTCbyBC0xbc54…7df0

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Adjust supply and borrow caps for 23 risk parameters across 14 assets on Aave V3 Polygon, Arbitrum, and Optimism. Most adjustments reduce excessively high caps on stablecoins (DAI, USDC, USDT, EURS, sUSD) to 16-60% of circulating supply, increase caps for assets at >75% utilization (WETH, LINK on Optimism), and freeze or reduce supply on certain assets (AAVE, WBTC) to manage risk. Four assets (GHST, SUSHI, BAL, AAVE on Arbitrum) remain unchanged due to liquidity concerns despite high utilization.

Type
parameter change

Key changes

  • Arbitrum DAI: Supply cap reduced from 2,000,000,000 to 50,000,000; new borrow cap of 30,000,000 (38% of circulating supply)(high)
  • Arbitrum USDC: Supply cap reduced from 2,000,000,000 to 150,000,000; new borrow cap of 100,000,000 (16% of circulating supply)(high)
  • Arbitrum USDT: Supply cap reduced from 2,000,000,000 to 50,000,000; new borrow cap of 35,000,000 (20% of circulating supply)(high)
  • Arbitrum EURS: New supply cap of 60,000 and borrow cap of 45,000 (60% of circulating supply)(medium)
  • Arbitrum AAVE: Supply cap reduced from 2,500 to 1,850 (frozen supply)(high)
  • Optimism DAI: Supply cap reduced from 2,000,000,000 to 25,000,000; new borrow cap of 16,000,000 (35% of circulating supply)(high)
  • Optimism USDC: Supply cap reduced from 2,000,000,000 to 150,000,000; new borrow cap of 100,000,000 (43% of circulating supply)(high)
  • Optimism USDT: Supply cap reduced from 2,000,000,000 to 25,000,000; new borrow cap of 16,000,000 (47% of circulating supply)(high)

Notable concerns

  • Four assets (GHST, SUSHI, BAL on Polygon and AAVE on Arbitrum) at >75% utilization not recommended for cap increases due to current liquidity levels
  • Multiple stablecoins had excessive supply caps (up to 2 billion) with no borrow caps previously, creating concentration risk
  • Supply caps on some assets represent >50% of total on-chain circulating supply before adjustment
ContractsAave V3 ArbitrumAave V3 OptimismAave V3 Polygon
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Read the description ↗

02Description

592 words

Simple Summary

A proposal to adjust twenty-three (23) total risk parameters, including Supply Cap and Borrow Cap, across fourteen (14) assets on Aave V3 Polygon, Arbitrum,and Optimism.

Motivation

The objective of this proposal is to recommend updated supply and borrow caps for:

  1. V3 stablecoins that have excessive supply caps set and/or have no set borrow cap.
  • The caps are intended to allow for substantial growth compared to the current supply while not set too excessively.
  • The recommendations for the supply caps are set to up to 40% of the circulating supply for most assets and no more than 60%. You can find the exact number for each asset in the tables below. Borrow caps are set to ~65% of the supply cap.
  1. V3 assets that have reached over 75% utilization of either cap.
  • The recommendations provided in this proposal were derived using Chaos Labs’ Updated Supply and Borrow Cap Methodology. Below are the data and considerations for the assets and recommended caps for these assets.
  1. Assets with a supply cap that is >50% of the asset's total on-chain circulating supply.

There following assets are at >75%. However, we do not recommend increasing their caps at this time due to current liquidity levels:

GHST (V3 Polygon) SUSHI (V3 Polygon) BAL (V3 Polygon) AAVE (V3 Arbitrum)

The respective governance forum discussion is linked below:

Specification

The following risk parameter proposal is presented below:

Arbitrum

AssetCurrent Supply CapRecommended Supply CapCurrent Borrow CapRecommended Borrow CapNotes
DAI2,000,000,00050,000,000N/A30,000,00038% of the circulating supply
EURSN/A60,000N/A45,00060% of the circulating supply
USDC2,000,000,000150,000,000N/A100,000,00016% of the circulating supply
USDT2,000,000,00050,000,000N/A35,000,00020% of the circulating supply
AAVE2,5001,850N/AN/Afreezes supply

Optimism

AssetCurrent Supply CapRecommended Supply CapCurrent Borrow CapRecommended Borrow CapNotes
DAI2,000,000,00025,000,000N/A16,000,00035% of the circulating supply
sUSD20,000,000No ChangeN/A13,000,00025% of the circulating supply
USDC2,000,000,000150,000,000N/A100,000,00043% of the circulating supply
USDT2,000,000,00025,000,000N/A16,000,00047% of the circulating supply
AAVE100,00045,000N/AN/Afreezes supply
LINK258,000160,000141,90084,000
WBTC1,100620605250freezes supply

Polygon

AssetCurrent Supply CapRecommended Supply CapCurrent Borrow CapRecommended Borrow Cap
WETH26,90050,00014,795No Change
AAVE36,82070,000N/AN/A

References

Forum Post

Tests: Arbitrum, Polygon, Optimism

Proposal payload implementation: Arbitrum, Polygon, Optimism

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorummedium confidenceclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The proposal describes risk-parameter (supply/borrow cap) updates across three networks (Arbitrum, Optimism, Polygon) via three separate payload contracts referenced by GitHub links. The decoded calldata shows exactly three actions, each an execute(address) call to a distinct cross-chain governance executor address, passing a distinct target payload address as argument — this matches the standard Aave cross-chain governance pattern (mainnet governance triggers bridged execution of a payload contract on each L2). The count (3) and structure (one execute per chain) align with the description's claim of three chains and three payload implementations. However, because the actual cap-setting logic (the 23 specific parameter changes across 14 assets) lives inside the target payload contracts and is not itself decoded in the provided calldata, I cannot directly verify the specific numeric values (e.g., DAI cap of 50,000,000 on Arbitrum) against on-chain state. This is typical of Aave's governance structure and not itself a red flag, but it does limit verification confidence to medium rather than high. No mismatches in target count, chain count, or general action type were found between the prose and the decoded actions.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

3 total
#0execute(address)chain 0x1
Target
0x158a…d45b
Value
0 wei
Function
execute(address)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0xeca5bdf0C2b352cBE2D9A19b555E1EC269d4765C"
}
Calldata
#1execute(address)chain 0x1
Target
0x2e2b…05f1
Value
0 wei
Function
execute(address)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0x060Bea15AF594FE9e0A243cA632F2C7D1935C70f"
}
Calldata
#2execute(address)chain 0x1
Target
0x5f5c…6711
Value
0 wei
Function
execute(address)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0x3A4F2A6c7E1E641AFAd6300553a0Bb82D6c46a2e"
}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters0
VP participating0
Outcome (current)—
Current support—

06Voters

0 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.