Gho Steward Update

The proposal follows Aave's standard governance pattern: a single on-chain action that calls execute() on a payload/executor contract, which internally performs the detailed logic (deploying the new GhoStewardV2, setting bps limits, cap update permissions, etc.). The decoded calldata here does not expose the internal parameters (the 50 bps fee delta, borrow cap, or exposure cap logic) because they live inside the payload contract's bytecode, not in the top-level calldata. This means I cannot directly verify the specific numeric claims (50 bps, cap changes) against decoded arguments — there simply are none to compare. However, this is a well-known and expected pattern for Aave proposals (single execute() call referencing a specific, linked payload contract whose source code is provided in the description's references), so there is no evidence of contradiction, hidden redirection, or malicious intent. Given the opacity of the single decoded action, confidence in a granular comparison is low, but nothing in the available data contradicts the description, so I classify this as consistent with low confidence rather than flagging speculative discrepancies mainly due to lack of decoded parameter data rather than any actual mismatch found.