KVORUM
compoundSource: Compound governor bravo · #75

Decentralized long-term security for Compound

defeatedDec 18, 2021, 07:21 PM UTCbyE60xe660…b1f8

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Compound Governance proposes to establish a decentralized, long-term security model for the protocol by onboarding multiple independent auditors through a structured program, rather than outsourcing to a single vendor. The proposal allocates funds to train and retain two top-tier auditors initially, with capacity for 300% of 2021 audit needs, while building a shared audit suite to manage protocol complexity and prevent vendor lock-in.

Type
treasury allocation
Funding
$$2,960,000 annually (initial year: $340,000 training + $2,620,000 streaming grants at $200/COMP)

Key changes

  • Establish decentralized auditor program with multiple independent security providers instead of single vendor outsourcing(high)
  • Create and maintain shared audit suite capturing attack scenarios and security knowledge across audits(high)
  • Implement 5-step RFP review process including early feedback, code review, audit suite development, tool-based analysis, and proposal verification(high)
  • Grant contributor COMP speed to address 0x5d7e535253CC5aB758F6aC1c97244a195D0b0012 at rate of 5226554267650160(medium)
  • Grant 1,700,000 COMP tokens to address 0x5d7e535253CC5aB758F6aC1c97244a195D0b0012 for initial auditor training and program setup(high)

Notable concerns

  • Relies on successful identification and commitment of multiple independent auditors meeting governance standards
  • Requires ongoing governance participation for annual re-evaluation and selection of auditors
  • Program complexity requires dedicated project management and IT safety expertise
  • Streaming grant mechanism dependent on COMP token price stability with quarterly adjustments needed
Contracts0x3d9819210a31b4961b30ef54be2aed79b9c9cd3b
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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02Description

970 words

Decentralized long-term security for Compound

Overview

We live in a new world where more and more DAOs are in control of a project. Ensuring that safe choices are made is a major challenge and DAOs have been exploring different approaches. According to current proposals, Compound would effectively outsource their security to a vendor who would take care of various security-related needs.

We believe that this approach is not the route to take. The chosen audit company would become a critical dependency for the protocol. The suggested solutions with their intransparent, quarterly, lump-sum payment for a mix of services do not focus on the most effective tools. Hence, we would like to suggest a process that can leverage the strength of the security community. The main security challenge for a protocol like Compound is the growing complexity that needs to be taken into account with every change.

  • Compound needs to ensure compatibility, failure to do so can have significant consequences.
  • Integrations must not be affected by the proposed changes.
  • Compound protocol grows and contracts must still interact correctly.

Overall, we conclude that such systems exhibit quadratic complexity growth. To tackle this, we aim for scalability. Furthermore, we believe that the security can best be ensured by a broad base of security providers. This prevents any form of vendor lock-in and conflicts of interest, while allowing to combine the strengths of different providers.

Process in a Nutshell

With this proposal, Compound Governance will allocate the necessary funds to onboard two independent top-tier auditors at current market prices assuming that each one of them provides the capacity to review 150% of the RFPs voted on in 2021, providing in total a capacity of 300% over the needs of 2021.

To ensure that Compound has competent code auditors at their proposal, the following process would be enacted:

  • Compound Governance votes in several code reviewers each year to onboard into auditing through a paid training phase.
  • Auditors apply to become wardens of Compound by providing:
    • An example of how a code review for the Comptroller and the cToken would be performed, detailing methods and time required.
    • The cost and amount of hours reserved for Compound per quarter, which are if accepted guaranteed to be paid by Compound.
    • The expected compensation for the training phase.
  • Onboarding code reviewers can also greatly benefit from the existing audit suite which contains many relevant attack scenarios.
  • Any time reserved for Compound not spent on reviewing code or RFPs is used to improve this audit suite.
  • Auditors who are selected by Governance and complete the training take shared ownership of the audit suite and collectively improve the coverage.
  • Delivering good work in improving the Compound Audit Suite will likely be used to evaluate the quality of the auditor which aligns interests long-term by increasing the likelihood of being voted in again next year.

The following process focuses on prevention and consists of 5 steps to be executed for each RFP:

  1. Early feedback during RFP stage with code reviewers adding security consideration paragraphs
  2. Perform thorough code review of newly developed code
  3. Develop an audit suite
  4. Leverage tool-based analysis where efficiently possible
  5. Perform the Proposal Verification

Benefits of the Audit Suite

Considering all the benefits explained in detail in the forum post, we believe that the audit suite can provide the necessary scalability by capturing a lot of the growing complexity. It requires an initial investment to build it up, but we consider it worthwhile.

Cost & Next Steps

For the first year, the total cost per auditor is expected to not exceed $1’370’000, which would cover 8 auditor-weeks of initial training ($170’000 one-time) and 24 auditor-days per month (quarterly fee of $300’000). This amount of auditor-days will cover the needs of Compound if 150% the capacity of 2021 will be required. For administration and maintenance of the program, an independent service provider with expertise in project management and IT safety will be chosen by Compound Governance with a compensation of $80’000 / year. To ensure that all of these services can be provided with high quality, ChainSecurity commits to provide an offer as one of the auditors not exceeding the caps mentioned above. We will also source at least one independent provider to maintain the program for consideration by Compound Governance and hand over control over the Gnosis Safe MultiSig to this provider once they are confirmed by Compound Governance. The initial request will cover the initial training for two auditors ($340’000 in COMP) and a streaming grant to cover audit cost at the cap for two auditors and the project maintainer ($620’000 per quarter) at $200 / COMP and 6500 blocks/day. A proposal for adjustment of the streaming grant to align COMP value with the value in USD will be done quarterly. Funds remaining at the end of the year in the MultiSig will be returned to Compound Governance.

Closing words

Our suggestion incentivizes broad participation from small to large security companies. Thereby, it broadens the base of experts in Compound and leverages proven techniques. Using the audit suite, we can aggregate the knowledge and insights from multiple audits (instead of only relying on the last audit) and thereby tackle the growing complexity. We believe that this provides a viable long-term solution. While even a single audit company chosen to shepherd the protocol could write such an audit suite, only by having multiple companies who rely on each other to have covered critical parts of the system enforces that a public, high-quality audit suite gets created. It also allows every security provider to play to their strengths when contributing. Lastly, it allows a decentralized verification of proposals by any community member.

Reference

Forum post with details

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorumclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The proposal describes two financial commitments: (1) a one-time $340,000 grant in COMP for initial training of two auditors, and (2) a recurring streaming grant of $620,000/quarter for auditor and maintainer costs, priced at $200/COMP with 6500 blocks/day. Checking the math: $340,000 / $200 = 1700 COMP, which exactly matches the _grantComp amount of 1700000000000000000000 wei (1700 COMP). For the streaming rate, $620,000/quarter / $200 = 3100 COMP per quarter; dividing by a quarter's blocks (6500 blocks/day * ~91.25 days ≈ 593,125 blocks) yields ≈0.0052266 COMP/block, which matches the _setContributorCompSpeed value of 5226554267650160 wei almost exactly. Both calldata actions target the same single address, which is plausibly the Gnosis Safe MultiSig mentioned in the description as the vehicle receiving and later distributing these funds — this is consistent with the narrative that funds flow into a multisig before eventual handover to a maintenance provider. No numeric mismatches, no unexplained extra actions, and no significant omissions were found; the proposal's financial mechanics are faithfully implemented on-chain. Confidence is high because the numbers reconcile precisely under the stated assumptions (price, block rate) rather than being approximate.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

2 total
#0_setContributorCompSpeed(address,uint256)chain 0x1
Target
0x3d98…cd3b
Value
0 wei
Function
_setContributorCompSpeed(address,uint256)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0x5d7e535253CC5aB758F6aC1c97244a195D0b0012",
  "1": "5226554267650160"
}
Calldata
#1_grantComp(address,uint256)chain 0x1
Target
0x3d98…cd3b
Value
0 wei
Function
_grantComp(address,uint256)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0x5d7e535253CC5aB758F6aC1c97244a195D0b0012",
  "1": "1700000000000000000000"
}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters4
VP participating3.5K
Outcome (current)Against
Current support0%

06Voters

4 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

AIForum synthesis by Kvorumclaude-sonnet-5
sentiment · mixedthread · constructive

Arguments for

  • Compound urgently needs a continuous, professional audit process for governance proposals to prevent a repeat of the Proposal 62 exploit.— sukernik, dvf, jamico, getty, OZSecure
  • Shifting the audit burden from individual contributors to a protocol-funded service will speed development and reduce risk of unreviewed code reaching governance votes.— sukernik, dvf, OZSecure, dguido
  • Top-tier firms like OpenZeppelin and Trail of Bits have deep, proven experience auditing Compound and the broader DeFi ecosystem, making them credible partners.— jamico, annamira, dvf, TylerEther
  • A layered security approach combining audits, education, threat monitoring, and advisory services adds value beyond simple ad-hoc auditing.— OZSecure, jamico, dguido
  • A short (quarterly-renewable) engagement lets the DAO evaluate vendor performance and adjust or cancel the arrangement relatively quickly.— jamico, OZSecure
  • Running a competitive, multi-vendor selection process (OZ, Trail of Bits, ChainSecurity) validates that the DAO is getting fair value and sets a template for future B2DAO deals.— sukernik, jamico, Rk2357, getty

Arguments against

  • The proposed fees (originally $8M/year) are far higher than market rates for comparable audit work, based on historical proposal volume and cost.— getty, allthecolors, dvf
  • The performance fee structure is poorly aligned with incentives, since auditors would almost certainly collect it regardless of effort or actual security outcomes.— dvf, allthecolors, arr00
  • Streaming indefinite COMP payments to a vendor is inappropriate; compensation should be periodic and re-authorized by governance each term.— arr00, allthecolors
  • OpenZeppelin's proposal scope crept well beyond the original request (education, monitoring, dashboards) and should have been split into separate proposals.— allthecolors, jared, dguido
  • The process felt rushed and favored a single vendor (OZ) due to a pre-existing conflict of interest with the proposer, undermining fair competition.— allthecolors, dguido, JacobPPhillips
  • Relying solely on external auditors ignores the deeper problem that Compound lacks internal QA, PM, and development process discipline.— RexShinka, dvf
  • A single-vendor, lump-sum model risks vendor lock-in and conflicts of interest; a decentralized multi-auditor 'audit suite' approach would better scale with protocol complexity.— HRitzdorf, jared, Emilie_ChainSecurity

Unresolved concerns

  • Whether the final agreed price (even after removing the performance fee) truly reflects fair market value for the services rendered.— getty, dvf, allthecolors
  • How Compound will fund ongoing security services once the COMP distribution schedule runs out in the long term.— allthecolors
  • Lack of a formal, repeatable process or governance mechanism for evaluating and selecting among competing vendor proposals.— sukernik, ratankaliani, JacobPPhillips
  • Whether Compound should invest in building an internal security/dev team rather than depending entirely on external auditors long-term.— RexShinka, dvf, HRitzdorf
  • Governance's inability to natively support multi-option or batched proposal voting, forcing reliance on an ad hoc community multisig process for vendor selection.— ratankaliani, JacobPPhillips, arr00

Notable participants

  • sukernikInitiated the proposal process, disclosed conflicts of interest, and organized the multi-vendor selection procedure.
  • OZSecureRepresented OpenZeppelin, submitted and repeatedly revised the primary competing proposal, and defended its pricing and scope.
  • dguidoRepresented Trail of Bits, submitted a competing proposal and pushed back on process fairness and OZ's approach.
  • gettyRaised the earliest and most detailed pricing critique of OZ's proposal.
  • dvfFrequent commenter providing security-industry perspective, critiqued performance fee incentives, and ultimately compared and endorsed OZ over Trail of Bits.
  • allthecolorsProvided the most thorough critique of process, conflicts of interest, scope creep, and cost/payment structure.
  • HRitzdorfRepresented ChainSecurity, proposed an alternative decentralized multi-auditor 'audit suite' model.
  • jamicoRepresented a16z, supported OZ's proposal, and helped broker the fair competitive process timeline.
  • jaredRaised questions about audit scope, timing, and favored a more comprehensive, process-oriented long-term solution.
  • Emilie_ChainSecurityClarified and defended ChainSecurity's multi-auditor 'audit suite' proposal in response to community questions.
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model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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