KVORUM
compoundSource: Compound governor bravo · #322

[Gauntlet] - WBTC v3 & v2 Mainnet Risk Recommendations

executedSep 8, 2024, 04:33 PM UTCby7B0x7b3c…cc33

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Gauntlet proposes risk parameter adjustments for WBTC across Compound's mainnet markets to enhance risk management in response to custody concerns: increasing liquidation penalty from 5% to 10%, reducing USDC supply cap from 18,000 to 10,000 WBTC, reducing USDT supply cap from 18,000 to 5,000 WBTC, and reducing Eth V2 borrow cap from 250 to 100 WBTC.

Type
parameter change

Key changes

  • Increase WBTC liquidation penalty from 5% to 10% on USDC Mainnet Comet(high)
  • Increase WBTC liquidation penalty from 5% to 10% on USDT Mainnet Comet(high)
  • Decrease WBTC supply cap from 18,000 to 10,000 on USDC Mainnet(high)
  • Decrease WBTC supply cap from 18,000 to 5,000 on USDT Mainnet(high)
  • Decrease WBTC borrow cap from 250 to 100 on Eth V2(high)

Notable concerns

  • Adjustments motivated by ongoing speculation surrounding WBTC custody by BitGo and BiTGlobal's joint venture
Contracts0x3d9819210a31b4961b30ef54be2aed79b9c9cd3b0x316f9708bb98af7da9c68c1c3b5e79039cd336e30x1ec63b5883c3481134fd50d5daebc83ecd2e8779
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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02Description

166 words

[Gauntlet] - WBTC v3 & v2 Mainnet Risk Recommendations

Summary

Gauntlet has made the following risk recommendations:

  • Increase Liquidation Penalty for WBTC from 5% to 10% across USDC & USDT Mainnet Comets
  • Decrease Supply Cap from 18,000 to 10,000 for WBTC on USDC Mainnet.
  • Decrease Supply Cap from 18,000 to 5,000 for WBTC on USDT Mainnet.
  • Decrease Borrow Cap from 250 to 100 for WBTC on Eth V2.

Motivation

Gauntlet recommends specific adjustments to the liquidation penalty, supply and borrow caps for WBTC on various Comets given the ongoing speculation across BitGo's and BiTGlobal's joint venture surrounding WBTC custody. The recommendations aim to enhance risk management across WBTC collateral.

Full proposal and forum discussions can be found here: WBTC Risk Recommendations

Specification

The proposal updates the parameters by using the respective methods on the Configurator.

By approving this proposal, you agree that any services provided by Gauntlet shall be governed by the terms of service available at gauntlet.network/tos

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorumclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

Compared each decoded action against the four bullet claims in the description. Action 0 correctly reduces the ETH V2 WBTC borrow cap from an implied 250 to 100 (10000000000 / 1e8 decimals = 100). Actions 1 and 4 set the liquidation factor to 0.9 on the USDC and USDT Comets respectively; since liquidationFactor = 1 - liquidationPenalty in Compound III, this corresponds exactly to a 10% liquidation penalty, matching the claimed increase from 5% to 10% on both markets. Actions 2 and 5 set the WBTC supply caps to 10,000 and 5,000 (after adjusting for 8-decimal WBTC units) on the USDC and USDT Comets respectively, matching the description exactly. Actions 3 and 6 are deployAndUpgradeTo calls that push the new Comet configuration live - these are standard, expected bookkeeping steps for Compound III configurator changes and are reasonably omitted from a summary description, consistent with the 'routine emissions/boilerplate' guidance. Target addresses for the USDC and USDT Comets match their well-known mainnet addresses. No value, target, or omission issues were found that a delegate would need to be warned about.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

7 total
#0_setMarketBorrowCaps(address[],uint256[])chain 0x1
Target
0x3d98…cd3b
Value
0 wei
Function
_setMarketBorrowCaps(address[],uint256[])
Arguments
{
  "0": [
    "0xccF4429DB6322D5C611ee964527D42E5d685DD6a"
  ],
  "1": [
    "10000000000"
  ]
}
Calldata
#1updateAssetLiquidationFactor(address,address,uint64)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetLiquidationFactor(address,address,uint64)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3",
  "1": "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599",
  "2": "900000000000000000"
}
Calldata
#2updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3",
  "1": "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599",
  "2": "1000000000000"
}
Calldata
#3deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)chain 0x1
Target
0x1ec6…8779
Value
0 wei
Function
deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3",
  "1": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3"
}
Calldata
#4updateAssetLiquidationFactor(address,address,uint64)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetLiquidationFactor(address,address,uint64)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB0840",
  "1": "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599",
  "2": "900000000000000000"
}
Calldata
#5updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB0840",
  "1": "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599",
  "2": "500000000000"
}
Calldata
#6deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)chain 0x1
Target
0x1ec6…8779
Value
0 wei
Function
deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
Arguments
{
  "0": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3",
  "1": "0x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB0840"
}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters0
VP participating0
Outcome (current)—
Current support—

06Voters

0 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

AIForum synthesis by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5
sentiment · favorablethread · constructive

Arguments for

  • Increased liquidation penalties to 10% would enhance liquidator incentives and provide a larger insolvency buffer to better protect the protocol if WBTC deteriorates following the custodianship transfer.— Gauntlet
  • Lowering underutilized WBTC supply caps maintains a 25%+ buffer for each market while reducing exposure without curtailing protocol growth.— Gauntlet
  • Risk-off parameters are warranted given heightened concerns around WBTC's custodial setup following BitGo's announcement of changes to BiT Global involvement.— Gauntlet

Arguments against

None surfaced.

Unresolved concerns

  • Questions pertaining to WBTC custodial auditing, transparency, and the broader role of BiT Global within the joint venture with BitGo remain unclear.— Gauntlet
  • Reliability of WBTC audits remains uncertain despite on-chain proof of reserve being available.— Gauntlet

Notable participants

  • GauntletProposer; risk management firm providing analysis and parameter recommendations for WBTC markets.
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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