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aaveSource: Aave governor v2 · #60

Aave V2 - Liquidity Mining Update (90 days at 30% reduced rate)

executedFeb 20, 2022, 11:14 AM UTCby5B0x5b3b…7c98

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Proposal to continue stkAAVE liquidity mining incentives on Aave V2 Ethereum for 90 days at 1,078 stkAAVE per day (30% reduction from AIP-47's 1,540 per day), estimated to cost $14.55M or 4.92% of Ecosystem Reserve, with incentives distributed across assets favoring borrowers on low volatility assets and lenders on high volatility assets.

Type
parameter change
Funding
$14.55M

Key changes

  • Reduction of daily stkAAVE incentives from 1,540 to 1,078 per day (30% decrease)(high)
  • 90-day duration for continued liquidity mining program on Aave V2 Ethereum(high)
  • Distribution methodology: 1:2 borrower-to-lender split for low volatility assets, lending-only incentives for high volatility assets favoring recently listed assets and strategic partners(high)
  • 35 AAVE bounty payment to proposers for gas refund(low)

Notable concerns

  • Net daily cost of $115K after accounting for Reserve Revenue, representing ongoing ecosystem spend
  • Recursive borrowing strategies remain profitable (289-292 bps) even after reduction, potentially maintaining inefficient capital allocation
  • TVL has reduced with market conditions, though incentive APR will also fall due to AAVE price changes
  • Program requires 4.92% of Ecosystem Reserve over 90 days
Contracts0x3b55a3c75137335be1c267f072595a8c8a734fb1
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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02Description

805 words

Simple Summary

This ARC presents the community with the opportunity to continue offering stkAAVE incentives on Aave V2 Ethereum market for an additional 90 days from when AIP-47 finishes at a further 30% reduced rate.

Liquidity mining incentives were introduced to Aave V2 on the 26th April 2021 via AIP-16, renewed by AIP-32 and then incentives were reduced by 30% with the implementation of AIP-47 which expires on the 20th February 2022. A summary is shown below.

  • AIP-16: 2,200 stkAAVE per day from 26th Apr 2021 on Aave V2 Ethereum market
  • AIP-32: 2,200 stkAAVE per day from 24th Aug 2021 on Aave V2 Ethereum market
  • AIP-47: 1,540 stkAAVE per day from 22nd Nov 2021 on Aave V2 Ethereum market
  • AIP-59: 1,078 stkAAVE per day from ~21st Feb 2022 on Aave V2 Ethereum market

Continuing on from AIP-47, incentives on low vol assets are to be split 1:2 in favour of borrowers over lenders. High vol assets will only receive lending incentives and this is skewed to favour more recently listed assets and communities that have a strategic relationship with Aave, like Balancer and Chainlink.

Motivation

This proposal continues on from AIP-47 with a further 30% tapering of incentives which was directionally communicated in the prior ARC and shall last for another proposed 90 day period. We will continue with the same rationale for how incentives are distributed across the Aave V2 Ethereum market.

Even though TVL has reduced with market conditions, the incentive APR will fall due to the change in the $AAVE price.

The below section outlines the proposed liquidity mining incentives to be applied from ~21.02.2021 up to and including ~20.05.2022.

Key details:

  • 30% reduction in incentives to 1,078 stkAAVE per day on Aave V2 Ethereum market
  • Distribution of stkAAVE is pro rata based upon deposit dollar value
  • A 35 AAVE bounty will be paid to the proposers to refund gas

The table below shows the intend stkAAVE distribution across the Aave V2 Ethereum market asset listings. In estimating the Borrowing vAPR, a 75% utilisation of the deposited assets was assumed. This was based on the current DAI utilisation.

Note: TVL per token is as per the 3rd February 2022.

Mathematics: % of value deposited x multiplier then scaled to provide LM Allocation that totals 100%. Link here.

Rationale

The previous LM campaign indicated the ongoing tapering on the Aave V2 Ethereum market that is presented within this proposal. The net incentive spend over the next 90 day period is reduced down from 1,540 to 1,078 stkAAVE per day.

Discussion

The previous LM proposal provides a lot of the context and rationale to how the stkAAVE incentives are distributed across the various assets on both markets. Link here. Something of interest on the Aave V2 Ethereum market, large holders currently can turn a 336 bps and 344 bps profit based on the existing emission schedule across the DAI and USDC pools by recursive borrowing. (Lending vAPY, - borrowing vAPR, + Borrowing Incentives vAPR, + Lending vAPY)

With the newly proposed emission schedule this 336 bps return minus gas becomes a 289 bps and 292 bps profit before gas. Time in the pool is also a huge factor, and those already invested in this type of strategy may continue to do so. However, it would be a lot less appealing to deploy this strategy now. Tapering the incentives reduces the profitability of recursive borrowing but not sufficiently so to support unwinding the positions. The opportunity cost becomes more something to consider.

Economics

  • Aave V2 Ethereum markets daily Reserve Revenue is averaging around $44.5K per day during late January 2022. Daily aToken interest is around $1.9K per day.
  • Liquidity Mining is estimated to cost $161,700 per day assuming 1,078 stkAAVE at $150 per token. Down from $231,000 per day assuming 1,540 stkAAVE at $150 per token. Note, previous LM was budgeted using a stkAAVE price of $320.
  • Ecosystem Reserve is worth around $296.89M with an AAVE price of $150.
  • 90 days at 1,078 stkAAVE at $150 per token is $14.55M or around 4.92% of the Ecosystem Reserve.
  • The Net spend is $115K per day after taking into consideration the daily Reserve Revenue and daily liquidity mining expenses. This does not take into consideration the 550 AAVE/day Safety Module incentives
  • Daily Reserve Revenue has reduced significantly during January and the chart below shows the image of the recent market conditions. Not the economics above only takes into consideration Aave V1 and V2 market revenue.

Further details on the daily Reserve Revenue and Economic Reserve valuation can be found on the Aave Treasury Dashboard created by the Llama Community. Please note, each query will need to be run separately.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorum

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04Actions

1 total
#0fallback()chain 0x1
Target
0x3b55…4fb1
Value
0 wei
Function
fallback()
Arguments
{}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters0
VP participating0
Outcome (current)—
Current support—

06Voters

0 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

AIForum synthesis by Kvorumclaude-sonnet-5
sentiment · mixedthread · constructive

Arguments for

  • Continuing liquidity mining at a reduced rate keeps Aave competitive with rivals like Compound and avoids losing capital to platforms offering better incentives.— MatthewGraham
  • A gradual, 30% taper avoids the sharp TVL and revenue collapse experienced when Polygon incentives were cut aggressively.— MatthewGraham, MarcZeller
  • Skewing incentives toward borrowers rather than lenders benefits the protocol since borrowers pay fees that grow the Reserve Factor and indirectly raise deposit yields.— MatthewGraham, Emilio
  • Incentives should be concentrated on stablecoins/low-volatility assets since these drive the bulk of borrowing demand and protocol revenue.— Emilio, eboado, MarcZeller
  • The 30% reduction is a fiscally prudent step relative to the size of the Ecosystem Reserve, enabling a sustainable long-term LM program.— MatthewGraham, MarcZeller
  • Adding incentives for co-aligned communities (e.g., BUSD, CRV, FRAX) helps build strategic relationships and can catalyze new liquidity and utilization.— MatthewGraham, Anjan-ParaFi, Emilio
  • Slowing the LM program could free capacity to explore complementary treasury tools like a bonding program for long-term sustainability.— MarcZeller

Arguments against

  • The proposed distribution is skewed too heavily toward lenders (especially ETH at 36% of allocation), contradicting the proposal's stated goal of favoring borrowers.— fig, pakim249
  • ETH and WBTC allocations were disproportionately high compared to stablecoins and needed to be reduced to better align with the stated strategy.— Emilio, eboado, pakim249
  • Incentivizing BUSD is not well justified given its negligible trading volume and growth on Aave despite its large market cap.— eboado
  • Asset selection (e.g., removing UNI and GUSD, including others) appears arbitrary, picking winners and losers without a formalized governance process for setting parameters.— pakim249
  • AMPL incentivization is risky and hard to model due to complex rebase dynamics and recurring liquidity crises after positive rebases.— eboado, pakim249

Unresolved concerns

  • Whether stkAAVE emissions could be made dynamic based on token price to improve capital efficiency was raised but never addressed.— fig
  • Disagreement over AMPL treatment persisted — some wanted it removed for risk reasons while others wanted a larger allocation due to high relative revenue.— Eele, eboado, pakim249
  • FEI incentives had to be dropped due to Aave V2's lack of support for dual-token (stkAAVE + TRIBE) rewards, leaving the technical limitation unresolved for future proposals.— Emilio, MatthewGraham
  • No formalized governance criteria exist for how assets are chosen or weighted for liquidity mining, a process concern that remained open.— pakim249

Notable participants

  • MatthewGrahamProposal author who incorporated community feedback through multiple revisions and finalized the distribution table before moving to a snapshot vote.
  • figEarly critical commenter questioning the lender/borrower split and requesting clearer data and rationale.
  • pakim249Repeated critic of asset selection logic, pushing for more borrower-weighted incentives and a more principled governance process.
  • EmilioAdvocated heavy reallocation toward stablecoins, flagged the FEI dual-reward technical issue, and pushed to expedite the proposal timeline.
  • eboadoProvided detailed asset-by-asset feedback on FEI, BAL, BUSD, AMPL, and ETH/WBTC allocations.
  • MarcZellerSupported the gradual LM decay and introduced the idea of a future bonding program for treasury sustainability.
  • Anjan-ParaFiDefended including BUSD incentives as a way to catalyze underused liquidity.
  • EeleAdvocated for increased AMPL incentive allocation citing its high revenue-to-size ratio.
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provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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