KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governor v2 · #11

introduce Liquidity Incentives for Aave v2

executedApr 25, 2021, 03:31 PM UTCbyF80xf82e…97b5

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Launch a 90-day liquidity mining program distributing 2,200 stkAAVE daily (~$1M daily) to lenders and borrowers across Aave v2 markets (DAI, GUSD, USDC, USDT, WBTC, WETH) pro-rata based on borrowing activity, with 50/50 lender-borrower splits for stablecoins and 95/5 splits for WBTC/ETH to discourage risky borrowing.

Type
protocol addition
Funding
$~$1,000,000 daily (2,200 stkAAVE per day for 90 days from 198,000 AAVE allocation)

Key changes

  • Activate incentives controller to distribute 2,200 stkAAVE daily across six Aave v2 markets (DAI, GUSD, USDC, USDT, WBTC, WETH)(high)
  • Allocate 198,000 AAVE from Ecosystem Reserve to incentives controller to fund 90-day program(high)
  • Set variable emission rates per second for aToken and variableDebt positions across supported markets(high)
  • Apply 50/50 lender-borrower reward ratio for stablecoin markets (DAI, GUSD, USDC, USDT)(medium)
  • Apply 95/5 lender-borrower reward ratio for WBTC and WETH markets to discourage risky borrowing(medium)
  • Distribute stkAAVE instead of AAVE to align long-term incentives and secure Safety Module through increased staking(medium)
  • Set 90-day program duration from execution with option for community to review and adjust parameters(medium)

Notable concerns

  • Program represents 5% of fully diluted AAVE supply released annually but proposes 90-day duration
  • Aave v1 still holds approximately 40% of protocol value and this program only incentivizes migration to v2
  • No vesting component included despite stkAAVE requiring 10-day cooldown period before unstaking
  • stkAAVE allocation methodology depends on borrowing activity snapshots which may not reflect optimal market incentives
  • Program end date of approximately 90 days provides limited data for community to analyze before renewal decisions
Contracts0x7b2a3CF972C3193F26CdeC6217D27379b6417bD00xE994d6d8595741a6245bC3197fD66C10a3E75C5f0x1C050bCa8BAbe53Ef769d0d2e411f556e1a27E7B0x3F06560cfB7af6E6B5102c358f679DE5150b3b4C0xC2fcab14Ec1F2dFA82a23C639c4770345085a50F0x541dCd3F00Bcd1A683cc73E1b2A8693b602201f40x3F87b818f94F3cC21e47FD3Bf015E8D8183A3E080x4aBF3e82D5f45A8D8E8C48B544bcA562e20EE2ff0x1f57Cc62113C3a6346882DcF3Ed49120411ac2d20x99E81EDbcab512d393638C087fD29c3DC6c9B00E0x52fdFB1157878f540DCB961561ce5F3b0bbe6f800xDddE1FA049209Bc24B69D5fa316a56EfeC918D790x5778DAee2a634acd303dC9dC91e58D57C8FFfcC8
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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02Description

859 words

Motivation

We believe that a well designed LM program can accomplish the following:

Grow lending and borrowing activity in targeted markets: With almost every major DeFi protocol launching a liquidity mining program, we believe it would be advantageous for Aave to utilize part of the Ecosystem Reserve to drive lending and borrowing activity across markets. Distributing AAVE to borrowers and lenders acts as an added incentive to attract more capital. The distribution can become more targeted over time. For example, certain markets may need more AAVE than others based on liquidity, utilization, and maturity of the market.

Broader distribution and protocol decentralization: Rewarding AAVE to users of the protocol improves the distribution of the AAVE token. This gets AAVE into the hands of more users, further decentralizing the protocol.

Deprecating Aave v1: Due to high gas fees and a lack of incentive to migrate, Aave v1 still contains approximately 40% of the value locked in the broader Aave protocol. By introducing liquidity mining rewards only on Aave v2, liquidity providers and borrowers will naturally migrate toward the optimized version. Declining liquidity on Aave v1 will facilitate a gradual deprecation of this iteration of the protocol, allowing more development activity to be directed at Aave v2.

This program is being proposed as a beta to further investigate how the inclusion of liquidity mining rewards will benefit the Aave ecosystem. From a supply perspective, this distribution results in only 5% of the fully diluted AAVE supply released each year. This enables Aave to experiment with liquidity mining rewards while saving the majority of the ecosystem reserves for other growth initiatives and grants. If this AIP passes, the Aave community can reflect on total supply/borrow and utilization by market to further refine the distribution program.

The forum poll closed with 62% of participants supportive of introducing rewards.

AIP rationale

2,200 stkAAVE per day will be allocated pro-rata across supported markets based on the dollar value of the borrowing activity in the underlying market. While Aave has seen success without rewards so far, this program would attempt to supercharge its growth at a relatively low cost to the treasury and AAVE holders.

This distribution strategy rewards markets based on borrow demand. Markets with higher dollar value borrowed receive a higher share of the daily stkAAVE rewards. stkAAVE will be allocated at a 50/50 ratio between lenders and borrowers across stablecoin markets. In WBTC and ETH markets, the ratio between lenders and borrowers will be 95/5 to discourage riskier borrowing activity.

stkAAVE will be rewarded instead of AAVE to align long-term incentives, disincentivize speculative farmers, and allow users to earn an underlying yield on top of the AAVE they earn. This helps align LPs by giving them more governance weight upfront and secure the protocol by increasing the amount of AAVE staked in the Safety Module. LPs then immediately earn a staking yield on their vested AAVE.

stkAAVE requires a 10 day cooldown period. The cooldown period must be started before LPs can unstake their AAVE. After the cooldown period, users have a 2 day window to unstake.

To simplify the implementation and allow the community to analyze the distribution first, this proposal does not include a vesting component. As we approach the target end date for the LM program, we encourage the community to explore any vesting structures for stkAAVE.

We propose 7/15/21 as the target end date for this liquidity mining program. A mid-July end date gives the community 3 months of activity to analyze before voting to end, continue, or adjust the LM program.

AIP content in short

The purpose of this AIP is to introduce liquidity mining rewards for Aave v2.

This AIP would distribute 2,200 Staked AAVE (stkAAVE) per day, representing around 1M$ in rewards distributed daily to lenders and borrowers. Users will receive stkAAVE.

2,200 stkAAVE per day will be allocated pro-rata across the following markets based on the dollar value of the borrowing activity in the underlying market:

Aave

$ Value as of 3/22/21

This program is structured as a beta, with the opportunity to track protocol activity and refine the distribution in the future.

The distribution has a target end date of 7/15/21. The community will be able to review the results of the LM program and adjust any parameters accordingly.

Abstract

Distribute 2,200 stkAAVE daily from the Ecosystem Reserve to borrowers and lenders

Ecosystem Reserve contract : https://etherscan.io/address/0x25f2226b597e8f9514b3f68f00f494cf4f286491#code

Implementations details

Proposal contract:

https://etherscan.io/address/0x5778DAee2a634acd303dC9dC91e58D57C8FFfcC8#code

The proposal will update the aDAI/GUSD/USDC/USDT/WBTC/WETH implementations and the variableDebt DAI/GUSD/USDC/USDT/WBTC/WETH implementation to set the Incentives controller to https://etherscan.io/address/0x5778DAee2a634acd303dC9dC91e58D57C8FFfcC8. The incentive controller will receive 198000 AAVE from the Aave ecosystem reserve https://etherscan.io/address/0x25f2226b597e8f9514b3f68f00f494cf4f286491.

The proposal sets the following emissions per second (in wei):

emissions[0] = 1706018518518520; //aDAI
emissions[1] = 1706018518518520; //vDebtDAI
emissions[2] = 92939814814815; //aGUSD
emissions[3] = 92939814814815; //vDebtGUSD
emissions[4] = 5291203703703700; //aUSDC
emissions[5] = 5291203703703700; //vDebtUSDC
emissions[6] = 3293634259259260; //aUSDT
emissions[7] = 3293634259259260; //vDebtUSDT
emissions[8] = 1995659722222220; //aWBTC
emissions[9] = 105034722222222; //vDebtWBTC
emissions[10] = 2464942129629630; //aETH
emissions[11] = 129733796296296; //vDebtWETH

The proposal will set the emission end date to 90 days from the moment the proposal is executed.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorummedium confidenceclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The decoded calldata consists of a single call to execute(address[6],address[6]) on the address explicitly identified in the description as the 'Proposal contract' (0x5778DAee...fCc8), passing two 6-element address arrays. This structure is consistent with the description's claim that aToken and variableDebtToken implementations for the six named markets (DAI, GUSD, USDC, USDT, WBTC, WETH) will be updated. Because Aave governance proposals of this era typically bundle all logic (implementation swaps, AAVE transfer to the Incentives Controller, emissions-per-second configuration, and distribution end date) inside a single payload contract's execute() function, the granular sub-actions described in the prose (198,000 AAVE transfer, specific emissions values, 90-day end date) are not separately visible in the decoded top-level call — this is expected/routine for this proposal pattern and not evidence of a mismatch. The target address matches exactly what the description cites, and the array shape (12 addresses = 6 aToken + 6 debtToken implementations) aligns with the described scope of markets. No value, target, or scope mismatches can be identified at the level of detail decoded. Confidence is medium rather than high because the internal effects of the execute() call (exact AAVE amount transferred, exact emission rates, exact end-date timestamp) cannot be independently verified from the decoded arguments alone — only the high-level shape and target address can be confirmed to match the description.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

1 total
#0execute(address[6],address[6])chain 0x1
Target
0x5778…fcc8
Value
0 wei
Function
execute(address[6],address[6])
Arguments
{
  "0": [
    "0x7b2a3CF972C3193F26CdeC6217D27379b6417bD0",
    "0xE994d6d8595741a6245bC3197fD66C10a3E75C5f",
    "0x1C050bCa8BAbe53Ef769d0d2e411f556e1a27E7B",
    "0x3F06560cfB7af6E6B5102c358f679DE5150b3b4C",
    "0xC2fcab14Ec1F2dFA82a23C639c4770345085a50F",
    "0x541dCd3F00Bcd1A683cc73E1b2A8693b602201f4"
  ],
  "1": [
    "0x3F87b818f94F3cC21e47FD3Bf015E8D8183A3E08",
    "0x4aBF3e82D5f45A8D8E8C48B544bcA562e20EE2ff",
    "0x1f57Cc62113C3a6346882DcF3Ed49120411ac2d2",
    "0x99E81EDbcab512d393638C087fD29c3DC6c9B00E",
    "0x52fdFB1157878f540DCB961561ce5F3b0bbe6f80",
    "0xDddE1FA049209Bc24B69D5fa316a56EfeC918D79"
  ]
}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters109
VP participating741.3K
Outcome (current)For
Current support99.7%

06Voters

109 total
Filter:
VoterChoice% of totalRationale
DD0xdd70…8202For191.6K25.85%—6y ago
360x36c4…2a8aFor106.8K14.40%—6y ago
9B0x9b5e…0499For100.7K13.58%—6y ago
C40xc4a9…2935For92.5K12.48%—6y ago
140x1494…3c2bFor65.7K8.87%—6y ago
A30xa3f0…b233For63.6K8.58%—6y ago
700x704d…a0dfFor39.5K5.33%—6y ago
800x80dc…c146For26.7K3.60%—6y ago
4B0x4bf0…40fcFor26.1K3.51%—6y ago
4A0x4a8b…c337For6.7K0.91%—6y ago
510x510b…9938For4.8K0.65%—6y ago
970x9757…e331For4K0.54%—6y ago
8F0x8f44…019dFor2.5K0.34%—6y ago
FA0xfa61…1f5cFor1.4K0.19%—6y ago
F50xf569…271bAgainst1.1K0.15%—6y ago
F70xf7ea…938cFor1K0.13%—6y ago
7B0x7bfe…c060For657.10.09%—6y ago
090x0991…46cdFor588.10.08%—6y ago
CA0xca76…6f46Against5250.07%—6y ago
1B0x1b2e…0b14For426.60.06%—6y ago
F70xf7b9…fe44For409.90.06%—6y ago
2C0x2ca1…659bFor404.20.05%—6y ago
C10xc179…8ccaFor2510.03%—6y ago
820x82bb…f7c2For250.80.03%—6y ago
AE0xaea6…4e95For210.90.03%—6y ago
DA0xda0f…fe5aAgainst2000.03%—6y ago
B70xb747…e0d7For171.90.02%—6y ago
910x9185…024fFor150.40.02%—6y ago
2C0x2c68…54cdFor150.30.02%—6y ago
6F0x6fb5…3744For1500.02%—6y ago
CF0xcfa6…e428For133.80.02%—6y ago
660x66b2…78deFor114.10.02%—6y ago
640x64ac…51b8For111.20.01%—6y ago
760x768c…8f1fFor110.50.01%—6y ago
C50xc53a…6175For104.10.01%—6y ago
A30xa334…e701For1010.01%—6y ago
F70xf72a…e97cFor1000.01%—6y ago
560x5674…9b7cFor1000.01%—6y ago
860x865b…5c64For1000.01%—6y ago
280x2875…63e9For84.70.01%—6y ago
AB0xabe7…ae28For72.10.01%—6y ago
7F0x7f18…caedFor70.60.01%—6y ago
970x970d…f7afFor64.80.01%—6y ago
E20xe29f…4573For61.90.01%—6y ago
AC0xac15…1a38For50.40.01%—6y ago
030x037d…92ffFor50.20.01%—6y ago
8D0x8d07…a265For500.01%—6y ago
6F0x6f23…f633For470.01%—6y ago
E50xe585…330eFor46.90.01%—6y ago
AD0xad54…99d1For43.70.01%—6y ago
Showing 50

07Forum

AIForum synthesis by Kvorumclaude-sonnet-5
sentiment · mixedthread · constructive

Arguments for

  • Liquidity mining will grow lending and borrowing activity and attract more capital to targeted markets at relatively low cost to the treasury.— Anjan-ParaFi, IDKFAIRL, Alex_Beasant, Alok_StandardCrypto
  • Distributing AAVE more broadly will decentralize the token holder base and improve governance distribution.— Anjan-ParaFi, Alex_Beasant
  • Rewards only on v2 will naturally incentivize migration from v1, helping deprecate the older, less efficient version.— Anjan-ParaFi, IDKFAIRL, shane, haave
  • Paying rewards in stkAAVE aligns long-term incentives, increases Safety Module security, and lets users earn staking yield on top of rewards.— Anjan-ParaFi, IDKFAIRL, Alex_Beasant, Emilio
  • The proposal should be treated as a low-cost, capped experiment with clear success metrics that can be scaled up or down later.— Alok_StandardCrypto, Anjan-ParaFi
  • External integrators (e.g. PoolTogether) show liquidity mining can be positive-sum and bring meaningful new capital without direct sell pressure.— lay2000lbs
  • A more targeted distribution focused on high-utility stablecoin/major asset pools (rather than a broad list) would drive real organic growth and migration.— defi_stalker, mapleleafcap, Alok_StandardCrypto, Quodlibet

Arguments against

  • The Ecosystem Reserve is finite and combined staking+LM emissions could deplete it too quickly, especially during a bull market.— Aavenstein, RyanRam, Dydymoon
  • Aave has grown successfully without liquidity mining, so the incentive is unnecessary and risks undermining a proven organic growth model.— RyanRam, davidkohcw, Lenoons, TokenBrice, Zer0dot
  • The 10-day stkAAVE cooldown is too short to be a real vesting mechanism and won't stop mercenary farmers from dumping rewards.— davidkohcw, mapleleafcap, EzR3aL, EmmanuelD
  • Rewards will disproportionately benefit large holders/whales rather than achieving genuine decentralization.— RyanRam, pray.eth, EmmanuelD
  • Treasury funds would be better spent on grants, developer incentives, and ecosystem/real-world integrations rather than farming rewards.— TheoRochaix, davidkohcw, pray.eth, Zer0dot, Dydymoon
  • Liquidity mining risks distorting protocol dynamics (e.g. recursive borrow/deposit loops) similar to problems seen on Compound.— Son_of_Ishtar, TokenBrice, jshinehorn
  • Distributing stkAAVE to non-holders dilutes and disincentivizes existing AAVE staking, reducing Safety Module security value.— Chupacabra, EmmanuelD

Unresolved concerns

  • No clear, agreed-upon rationale was given for which specific markets/assets should be included in the initial incentive list.— Quodlibet, defi_stalker, azfi
  • The appropriate length of the reward vesting/cooldown period (10 days vs months) remained debated without final resolution in the thread.— davidkohcw, mapleleafcap, Alok_StandardCrypto
  • High Ethereum gas costs make claiming small stkAAVE rewards impractical for many users, and no agreed solution (e.g., autodropping) was reached.— igorb, Emilio, Chupacabra
  • Whether stkAAVE rewards to non-holders undermine existing AAVE staking incentives and Safety Module security was never fully addressed.— Chupacabra
  • The overall size/duration cap for the liquidity mining experiment (e.g., 550 AAVE/day indefinitely vs. a capped budget) was not settled before moving to AIP.— Alok_StandardCrypto

Notable participants

  • Anjan-ParaFiOriginal proposer who outlined the liquidity mining design and later synthesized community feedback before moving to AIP.
  • RyanRamVocal early opponent arguing the proposal misallocates the ecosystem reserve and duplicates existing organic incentives.
  • davidkohcwProvided a detailed, multi-point argument against the proposal, favoring alternative uses of treasury funds.
  • defi_stalkerOffered detailed quantitative critique of proposed markets/emissions and proposed a more targeted stablecoin-focused alternative.
  • mapleleafcapSuggested weighting incentives toward stablecoin lending and longer vesting schedules.
  • Alok_StandardCryptoRepresented Standard Crypto, proposed treating the program as a capped, metric-driven experiment with specific pool weightings.
  • EzR3aLProposed a multiplier/burn mechanism to discourage short-term farming and encourage long-term liquidity provision.
  • ChupacabraRaised concerns that stkAAVE rewards to non-holders undermine staking incentives and Safety Module security.
  • TheoRochaixStrongly opposed liquidity mining, advocating instead for grants and developer-focused treasury spending.
  • EmilioEngaged in technical debate about gas costs and claim mechanics for distributing stkAAVE rewards.
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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