The proposal uses Aave's standard cross-chain governance pattern: the mainnet AIP calldata contains a single forwardPayloadForExecution call that relays execution to a payload contract deployed on Polygon (chain id 137), which is referenced in the proposal's 'Implementation' link as AaveV2Polygon_ReserveFactorUpdatesPolygonAaveV2. This is the normal mechanism for AIPs that modify parameters on L2/sidechain deployments and is not itself a discrepancy — the actual per-asset Reserve Factor updates (DAI 51%, USDC 53%, USDT 52%, wBTC 85%, wETH 75%, MATIC 71%, BAL 99%) are expected to live inside that forwarded payload contract's bytecode, which is not decoded here. Because the on-chain calldata visible to us is only the forwarding call and not the individual setReserveFactor calls, we cannot directly verify each numeric value against the table, but this is consistent with how every similar Aave V2 Polygon parameter-update AIP is structured, and the target payload address matches the linked implementation contract referenced in the description. No target mismatch, value mismatch, or omitted/extra action is evident within the scope of what is decoded. Confidence is set to medium rather than high because the actual reserve factor values are only verifiable by inspecting the forwarded payload contract's source, which is linked but not decoded in the provided calldata.