Ethereum v2 - Parameters Update
01Summary
Proposal to increase Reserve Factors (RF) across 18 assets on Aave V2 Ethereum by 5% increments to incentivize migration to V3. RFs increasing for stablecoins (DAI, GUSD, LUSD, USDC, USDP, USDT from 10% to 15%), select tokens (1INCH, CRV, ENS, LINK, MKR, UNI, wBTC from 20% to 25%), and other assets (FRAX, sUSD from 20% to 25%; ETH from 15% to 20%; SNX from 35% to 40%; TUSD from 5% to 25%). Minimum 2-week gap between subsequent increments with assessment of user elasticity before each update.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- DAI Reserve Factor increased from 10% to 15%(medium)
- FRAX Reserve Factor increased from 20% to 25%(medium)
- GUSD Reserve Factor increased from 10% to 15%(medium)
- LUSD Reserve Factor increased from 10% to 15%(medium)
- sUSD Reserve Factor increased from 20% to 25%(medium)
- TUSD Reserve Factor increased from 5% to 25%(high)
- USDC Reserve Factor increased from 10% to 15%(medium)
- USDP Reserve Factor increased from 10% to 15%(medium)
Notable concerns
- TUSD Reserve Factor increase of 20 percentage points is substantially larger than other assets (5% increments)
- Frozen V2 assets will be addressed in separate proposal
- Migration success dependent on user elasticity which will be assessed between increments
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Simple Summary
A proposal for a series of Reserve Factor (RF) increases across all V2 Ethereum assets.
Motivation
In line with our V2 to V3 migration plan, we propose a series of RF increases on Aave V2 Ethereum.
By progressively increasing the reserve factors, the interest rate for supplying these assets on V2 will be increasingly less attractive, thus encouraging suppliers to transition positions to V3.
This proposal intends to incrementally increase the reserve factors by 5% at each step. After implementing each increment, we’ll assess user elasticity and the impact of the updates before moving forward with additional increases. We will ensure a minimum gap of 2 weeks between each subsequent update.
Please note that a separate proposal will be made for frozen assets on V2.
Specification
The following parameters are to be updated:
| Asset | Current RF | Recommended RF |
|---|---|---|
| DAI | 10.00% | 15.00% |
| FRAX | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| GUSD | 10.00% | 15.00% |
| LUSD | 10.00% | 15.00% |
| sUSD | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| TUSD | 5.00% | 25.00% |
| USDC | 10.00% | 15.00% |
| USDP | 10.00% | 15.00% |
| USDT | 10.00% | 15.00% |
| 1INCH | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| CRV | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| ENS | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| LINK | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| MKR | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| SNX | 35.00% | 40.00% |
| UNI | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| wBTC | 20.00% | 25.00% |
| ETH | 15.00% | 20.00% |
Implementation
A list of relevant links like for this proposal:
The proposal Payload was reviewed by Bored Ghost Developing.
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal follows the standard Aave governance pattern where a single top-level action invokes execute() on a dedicated payload contract, which internally performs the granular reserve factor updates described in the specification table. The decoded calldata for this proposal only shows the generic execute() call and does not expose the internal per-asset parameter changes (target pool, asset addresses, and specific RF values) that would be needed to directly verify each of the 18 claimed reserve factor increases against on-chain state changes. Because the payload contract's internal logic is not decoded here, I cannot confirm or deny that the specific percentages (e.g., DAI 10%->15%, TUSD 5%->25%, SNX 35%->40%) match exactly what execute() will do. There is no evidence of contradiction — the single action is consistent with a proposal that adjusts multiple reserve factors — but the granularity needed for a high-confidence comparison is unavailable. Per instructions, when the description is too vague/calldata too opaque to compare directly, confidence should be low and no speculative discrepancies should be raised. I found no red flags such as unexpected transfers, role grants, or address mismatches in the visible calldata; the single call target is consistent with a payload execution pattern used by Aave governance for this type of parameter-update proposal.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0xf64c…8572
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- fallback()
- Arguments
{}- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.
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