Enable SVR on Base and Arbitrum

The proposal follows Aave's standard governance payload pattern: a single on-chain action calls execute() on a payload contract, and the actual multi-step logic (revoking roles on Ethereum, granting roles and enabling oracles on Arbitrum and Base via cross-chain messaging) is embedded inside that payload contract's bytecode rather than exposed as separate decoded calldata arguments. The decoded action set here contains only one row — a bare execute() call with no arguments — so there is no way to independently verify the specific role grants, asset lists, or cross-chain targets described in the prose purely from the calldata provided. This is typical and expected for Aave payload-based proposals; the description links to the actual Solidity implementation and test files for verification, which is the standard practice for this proposal type. Since no contradicting on-chain data is available and the pattern matches expected Aave governance architecture, I found no verifiable discrepancy, but confidence is low because the calldata alone does not provide enough granularity to confirm the specific claims (roles, asset lists) made in the description. This should not be treated as a red flag — it reflects an architectural limitation of decoding a proxy/executor call rather than evidence of tampering.