Extend SVR V1 to more reserves

The proposal follows Aave's standard governance pattern where the top-level proposal calls execute() on one or more payload contracts, which internally perform the granular logic (role grants, oracle updates) via delegatecall. The decoded calldata shows exactly two such execute() calls, targeting two distinct addresses. This matches the description's structure exactly: it references two separate implementation files — one for AaveV3Ethereum (Core instance, covering eBTC/cbBTC/WBTC) and one for AaveV3EthereumLido (Prime instance, covering USDC/WETH/rsETH/ezETH/wstETH). Because the calldata for execute() carries no decoded arguments (typical for this delegatecall payload pattern), the specific asset lists, role grant, and steward address named in the description cannot be independently verified from the calldata alone. However, the number of actions, their target addresses matching the two payload contracts referenced in the description's GitHub links, and the overall structure are all consistent with what is claimed. No value transfers, unexpected targets, or extra actions are present. Given the opacity of the fallback-only decoded arguments, confidence is medium rather than high, but there is no evidence of any discrepancy between the prose and the on-chain actions.