KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governance v3 · #359

Claiming AAVE Rewards for the Sablier Legacy v1.1 Contract

executedAug 24, 2025, 03:36 PM UTCby570x57ab…2922

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Aave governance proposes transferring 895.8057 AAVE (~$160K) in accrued staking rewards from the Aave Safety Module to Sablier's treasury (sablier.eth) because the Sablier Legacy v1.1 contract cannot claim these rewards due to its immutable design lacking reward-claiming and recovery functions.

Type
treasury allocation
Funding
$~$160,000

Key changes

  • Transfer 895.8057 AAVE staking rewards from Aave Safety Module to Sablier Legacy v1.1 contract address (sablier.eth)(high)
  • Call claimRewardsOnBehalf() function to collect accrued rewards from the Aave Safety Module(high)

Notable concerns

  • Sablier Legacy v1.1 contract is non-upgradeable and immutable, creating permanent recovery challenges for future rewards
  • This is a one-time governance intervention to recover legitimately earned but otherwise inaccessible rewards
Contracts0xCD18eAa163733Da39c232722cBC4E8940b1D88880x5cE95bff1297dADBDcF9929a10Bd02BDfab0DCC6
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Read the description ↗

02Description

175 words

Simple Summary

This AIP proposes the transfer of 895.8057 AAVE (~$160K) in staking rewards from the Aave Safety Module to sablier.eth, due to the inability of Sablier’s Legacy v1.1 contract to claim them through standard mechanisms.

Motivation

Sablier Legacy v1.1 is a non-upgradeable smart contract that lacks an ERC-20 recovery or sweeping function. Over time, the contract has accrued staking rewards from participation in the Aave Safety Module. However, due to its immutable design and lack of reward-claiming logic, these tokens are currently inaccessible.

To prevent permanent loss of funds, this proposal seeks governance approval to manually transfer the AAVE rewards to the Sablier treasury (sablier.eth), ensuring recovery of assets legitimately earned.

Supporting context:

Specification

This proposal calls claimRewardsOnBehalf() on 0xCD18eAa163733Da39c232722cBC4E8940b1D8888 and then transfer 895805689180182547296 wei of AAVE collected to sablier.eth

References

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorummedium confidenceclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The proposal follows the standard Aave governance execution pattern: a single on-chain action that calls execute() on a payload contract (0x98e5f4e669abdc52c632cab40aa17ce6aa76ac17), which internally performs the logic detailed in the linked Solidity implementation file (claimRewardsOnBehalf on the Sablier Legacy contract, followed by an AAVE transfer to sablier.eth). This one-action 'execute()' wrapper is routine boilerplate for Aave AIPs and is not itself a discrepancy — the decoded calldata for the top-level governance action legitimately does not expose the internal claim/transfer steps because those are encoded within the payload contract bytecode, not the top-level calldata. Since the decoded action only shows 'fallback()' with no further internal call trace, I cannot independently verify the exact amount (895.8057 AAVE) or recipient (sablier.eth) referenced in the payload's internal logic, which is why confidence is medium rather than high. However, the described specification matches the expected architecture (target contract for claiming = 0xCD18eAa163733Da39c232722cBC4E8940b1D8888, recipient = sablier.eth, and amount is explicitly reproduced in the description with the exact wei value), and there is no evidence in the decoded action of a different target, value, or extra action that would contradict the description. Based on the information available, there is no material or severe mismatch between the prose and the decoded action; it is standard practice for Aave payload-based proposals to show only the execute() call at the top level.》

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

1 total
#0fallback()chain 0x1
Target
0x98e5…ac17
Value
0 wei
Function
fallback()
Arguments
{}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters0
VP participating0
Outcome (current)—
Current support—

06Voters

0 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.