KVORUM
compoundSource: Compound governor oz · #571

Reduce Borrow Collateral Factor and Supply Caps for USDe to 0 on Ethereum

executedApr 24, 2026, 05:26 AM UTCbyD20xd2a7…5a0c

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Proposal to reduce USDe borrow collateral factor and supply caps to 0 on Ethereum across multiple Comet markets, preventing USDe from being used as collateral for new loans while mitigating rsETH hack risks. Existing positions will not be liquidated.

Type
parameter change

Key changes

  • Set borrow collateral factor for USDe (0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3) to 0 across three Comet markets(high)
  • Set supply cap for USDe to 0 across three Comet markets(high)
  • Deploy and upgrade configurator for affected Comet proxies(medium)

Notable concerns

  • Prevents USDe from being used as new collateral, which may impact existing USDe holders' borrowing capacity
  • Risk mitigation measure tied to potential rsETH hack, indicating underlying protocol security concerns
Contracts0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc30x5D409e56D886231aDAf00c8775665AD0f9897b560x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB08400x316f9708bb98af7da9c68c1c3b5e79039cd336e30x1ec63b5883c3481134fd50d5daebc83ecd2e8779
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Read the description ↗

02Description

76 words

Reduce Borrow Collateral Factor and Supply Caps for USDe to 0 on Ethereum

This proposal reduces the Collateral Factor utilized on borrow and Supply Caps for USDe; once executed, USDe on Ethereum markets can not be used as collateral for new loans. Note that this proposal will not directly trigger any liquidations as the liquidation collateral factor remains unchanged.

The proposal will minimize the potential risk of an rsETH hack in case it affects USDe.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorumclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The proposal describes reducing USDe's borrow collateral factor and supply cap to 0 across Ethereum Compound III (Comet) markets. The decoded calldata shows exactly this pattern repeated across three distinct Comet markets (0xc3d688..., 0x5D409e..., 0x3Afdc9...): each has updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor set to 0, updateAssetSupplyCap set to 0, and a deployAndUpgradeTo call. The deployAndUpgradeTo calls are the standard Compound III governance mechanism required to push configurator changes live to the Comet proxy — this is routine bookkeeping for this contract type and its omission from the prose is expected summarization, not a hidden action. The numeric values (0 for both CF and supply cap) match the prose claim of reducing to 0 exactly, with no unit conversion issues. The description's plural 'Ethereum markets' aligns with the three separate Comet proxies being modified. No liquidation CF changes appear in the calldata, consistent with the description's explicit note that liquidation collateral factor remains untouched. No unexplained transfers, role grants, or target mismatches are present. Overall the prose accurately and completely represents the on-chain actions.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

9 total
#0updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)
Arguments
{
  "asset": "0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3",
  "cometProxy": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3",
  "newBorrowCF": "0"
}
Calldata
#1updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)
Arguments
{
  "asset": "0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3",
  "cometProxy": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3",
  "newSupplyCap": "0"
}
Calldata
#2deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)chain 0x1
Target
0x1ec6…8779
Value
0 wei
Function
deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
Arguments
{
  "cometProxy": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3",
  "configuratorProxy": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3"
}
Calldata
#3updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)
Arguments
{
  "asset": "0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3",
  "cometProxy": "0x5D409e56D886231aDAf00c8775665AD0f9897b56",
  "newBorrowCF": "0"
}
Calldata
#4updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)
Arguments
{
  "asset": "0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3",
  "cometProxy": "0x5D409e56D886231aDAf00c8775665AD0f9897b56",
  "newSupplyCap": "0"
}
Calldata
#5deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)chain 0x1
Target
0x1ec6…8779
Value
0 wei
Function
deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
Arguments
{
  "cometProxy": "0x5D409e56D886231aDAf00c8775665AD0f9897b56",
  "configuratorProxy": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3"
}
Calldata
#6updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)
Arguments
{
  "asset": "0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3",
  "cometProxy": "0x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB0840",
  "newBorrowCF": "0"
}
Calldata
#7updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)chain 0x1
Target
0x316f…36e3
Value
0 wei
Function
updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)
Arguments
{
  "asset": "0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3",
  "cometProxy": "0x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB0840",
  "newSupplyCap": "0"
}
Calldata
#8deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)chain 0x1
Target
0x1ec6…8779
Value
0 wei
Function
deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
Arguments
{
  "cometProxy": "0x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB0840",
  "configuratorProxy": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3"
}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters18
VP participating817.7K
Outcome (current)For
Current support100%

06Voters

18 total
Filter:
VoterChoice% of totalRationale
3F0x3fb1…4c8aFor104.8K12.81%—7mo ago
660x66cd…65f9For80.2K9.81%—7mo ago
B30xb356…c826For60.3K7.38%—7mo ago
B40xb49f…7948For60K7.34%—7mo ago
050x0579…ca09For60K7.34%—7mo ago
170x1729…b879For60K7.34%—7mo ago
B70xb792…89d7For60K7.34%—7mo ago
B90xb933…8dd1For60K7.34%—7mo ago
D20xd2a7…5a0cFor60K7.34%—7mo ago
070x0703…961bFor51.7K6.33%—7mo ago
2B0x2b38…bf33For50.3K6.15%—7mo ago
4F0x4f89…fd3cFor50K6.11%—7mo ago
130x13bd…8548For30K3.67%—7mo ago
540x54a3…e189For29.9K3.66%—7mo ago
1F0x1f3d…0591For440.70.05%—7mo ago
C50xc554…7759For11.20.00%—7mo ago
9F0x9f77…2768For0.90.00%—7mo ago
2F0x2f2f…f78aFor0.50.00%—7mo ago
Showing 18

07Forum

No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.