Reduce Borrow Collateral Factor for rsETH to 0 on Ethereum Markets
01Summary
This proposal sets the borrow collateral factor for rsETH to 0 across three Ethereum Compound markets, preventing rsETH from being used as collateral for new loans in response to a Kelp DAO exploit. Existing positions will not be liquidated as the liquidation collateral factor remains unchanged.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Update rsETH (0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7) borrow collateral factor to 0 on Ethereum mainnet Comet markets(high)
- Deploy and upgrade configurator implementations for three Comet proxy instances to enforce the collateral factor changes(high)
Notable concerns
- The proposal is a response to a Kelp DAO exploit affecting rsETH
- While new loans cannot use rsETH as collateral, existing positions are not directly impacted as liquidation collateral factor remains unchanged
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Reduce Borrow Collateral Factor for rsETH to 0 on Ethereum Markets
This proposal reduces the collateral factor utilized on borrow for rsETH--once executed, rsETH on Ethereum markets can not be used as collateral for new loans. Note that this proposal will not directly trigger any liquidations as the liquidation collateral factor remains unchanged.
Please see the forums for further details
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal describes reducing the borrow collateral factor for rsETH to 0 across Ethereum markets, without directly affecting liquidation collateral factor. The calldata shows three pairs of actions, each targeting a distinct Compound V3 (Comet) market on Ethereum mainnet: a call to updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor setting the rsETH borrow CF to 0, followed by a deployAndUpgradeTo call to apply the configuration change to the live proxy. This matches the 'Ethereum markets' (plural) language in the description exactly — three separate markets are affected, each with the same rsETH asset address and the same newBorrowCF value of 0. The deployAndUpgradeTo calls are the standard Compound governance mechanism required to activate configurator changes and are routine bookkeeping consistent with this contract's normal operation, not a separate undisclosed action. No liquidation collateral factor parameter appears anywhere in the calldata, which is consistent with the description's claim that liquidations are not directly triggered. No value, target, or scope mismatches were found between the prose and the decoded actions. The description accurately and completely reflects what the on-chain calldata does, so I classify this as consistent with high confidence.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x316f…36e3
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)
- Arguments
{ "asset": "0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7", "cometProxy": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3", "newBorrowCF": "0" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x1ec6…8779
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
- Arguments
{ "cometProxy": "0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3", "configuratorProxy": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x316f…36e3
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)
- Arguments
{ "asset": "0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7", "cometProxy": "0xA17581A9E3356d9A858b789D68B4d866e593aE94", "newBorrowCF": "0" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x1ec6…8779
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
- Arguments
{ "cometProxy": "0xA17581A9E3356d9A858b789D68B4d866e593aE94", "configuratorProxy": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x316f…36e3
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- updateAssetBorrowCollateralFactor(address,address,uint64)
- Arguments
{ "asset": "0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7", "cometProxy": "0x3D0bb1ccaB520A66e607822fC55BC921738fAFE3", "newBorrowCF": "0" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x1ec6…8779
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
- Arguments
{ "cometProxy": "0x3D0bb1ccaB520A66e607822fC55BC921738fAFE3", "configuratorProxy": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3" }- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.
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