[Gauntlet]- Supply Cap Recommendations (2024-08-20)
01Summary
Gauntlet recommends increasing supply caps for two assets: WETH Arbitrum Comet's rsETH from 920 to 3,500 and USDT Ethereum Comet's wstETH from 9,000 to 15,000 to improve capital efficiency.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Increase WETH Arbitrum Comet's rsETH Supply Cap from 920 to 3,500(medium)
- Increase USDT Ethereum Comet's wstETH Supply Cap from 9,000 to 15,000(medium)
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
[Gauntlet]- Supply Cap Recommendations (2024-08-20)
Summary
Gauntlet recommends the following risk recommendations to the protocol:
- Increase WETH Arbitrum Comet’s rsETH Supply Cap from 920 to 3,500
- Increase USDT Ethereum Comet’s wstETH Supply Cap from 9,000 to 15,000
Motivation
This recommendation aims to increase supply caps for rsETH and wstETH on their respective Comets. Gauntlet recommends to increase supply caps to increase capital efficiency within the Comets. Full proposal and forum discussions can be found here.
Specification
The proposal updates the parameters by using the respective methods on the Configurator.
By approving this proposal, you agree that any services provided by Gauntlet shall be governed by the terms of service available at gauntlet.network/tos
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal describes two supply cap increases: (1) rsETH cap on the Arbitrum WETH Comet raised to 3,500, and (2) wstETH cap on the Ethereum USDT Comet raised to 15,000. Action 0 directly calls updateAssetSupplyCap on the mainnet Configurator for the USDT Comet with the wstETH asset address and a value of exactly 15,000e18, matching bullet 2 precisely. Action 1 is the standard deployAndUpgradeTo call that activates a configurator change on the Comet proxy — routine bookkeeping expected after any cap update and not something the description needs to call out separately. Action 2 is a cross-chain retryable ticket sent to the Arbitrum Inbox; this is the standard Compound governance pattern for applying Configurator changes on L2 Comets from L1 governance. Its embedded calldata contains both an updateAssetSupplyCap call and a deployAndUpgradeTo call targeting what appear to be the Arbitrum Configurator/ProxyAdmin and asset addresses, consistent with implementing the rsETH cap increase on the Arbitrum WETH Comet described in bullet 1. I could not byte-for-byte decode the embedded uint128 cap value with full certainty due to the nested ABI encoding, so confidence is medium rather than high, but the structure, involved contracts, and pattern strongly match the two described actions with no evidence of extra, missing, or mismatched targets/values. No discrepancies of note were found.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x316f…36e3
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- updateAssetSupplyCap(address,address,uint128)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB0840", "1": "0x7f39C581F595B53c5cb19bD0b3f8dA6c935E2Ca0", "2": "15000000000000000000000" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x1ec6…8779
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0x316f9708bB98af7dA9c68C1C3b5e79039cD336E3", "1": "0x3Afdc9BCA9213A35503b077a6072F3D0d5AB0840" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x4dbd…ab3f
- Value
- 1965798000000000 wei
- Function
- createRetryableTicket(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0x42480C37B249e33aABaf4c22B20235656bd38068", "1": "0", "2": "1393610000000000", "3": "0x3fB4d38ea7EC20D91917c09591490Eeda38Cf88A", "4": "0x3fB4d38ea7EC20D91917c09591490Eeda38Cf88A", "5": "1144376", "6": "500000000", "7": "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" }- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
- [Gauntlet]- Supply Cap Recommendations (2024-08-19) ↗discourse · high confidence
Arguments for
- Increasing rsETH supply cap on Arbitrum to 3,500 is justified by strong DEX liquidity and represents only 21% of circulating supply, enabling legitimate large borrowers to leverage rsETH for WETH leverage.— Gauntlet
- Increasing wstETH supply cap on Ethereum to 15,000 is supported by substantial DEX liquidity ($361M) with acceptable slippage (~4.5%) for large swaps.— Gauntlet
Arguments against
None surfaced.
Notable participants
- GauntletRisk management team proposing supply cap increases with liquidity analysis and recommendations.
Generated by Kvorum
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