Adjust cCOMP and cUNI Parameters
01Summary
Proposal increases cCOMP borrow cap from 90,750 to 150,000 COMP and adjusts interest rate models for both cCOMP and cUNI markets. cCOMP gets cUNI's higher rate model (increasing borrowing costs), while cUNI adopts cAAVE/cMKR/cYFI/cSUSHI's lower rate model (decreasing borrowing costs) for market normalization.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Increase cCOMP borrow cap from 90,750 to 150,000 COMP to accommodate high market utilization and reduce artificially compressed borrowing costs(high)
- Switch cCOMP interest rate model to cUNI's model, resulting in slightly higher borrowing costs across the utilization curve(high)
- Switch cUNI interest rate model to the model used for cAAVE/cMKR/cYFI/cSUSHI, normalizing it with similar assets and resulting in slightly lower borrowing costs(high)
Notable concerns
- cCOMP borrow cap increase may require ongoing governance participation to monitor governance manipulation risks
- Interest rate model changes will affect borrowing costs for users in affected markets
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Adjust cCOMP and cUNI Parameters
Summary
This proposal makes changes to the cCOMP and cUNI markets. The borrow cap for cCOMP is increased from 90,750 to 150,000 COMP, and the cCOMP interest rate model is switched to the rate model currently in use for cUNI, resulting in slightly higher borrowing costs across the utilization curve. The rate model for cUNI is switched to the rate model currently in use for cAAVE/cMKR/cYFI/cSUSHI, normalizing it with other similar assets and resulting in slightly lower borrowing costs across the utilization curve.
Reasoning
Recently the v2 cCOMP market has seen high utilization, with total borrowings currently at the 90,750 COMP borrow cap. This implies that market parameters are not well optimized and some users are taking advantage of artificially compressed borrowing costs. The proposed changes will increase borrowing capacity and borrow rates, which should help the market reach a more suitable equilibrium and increase supply rates.
While the COMP borrow cap still plays an important role in protecting against governance manipulation, recent votes have shown strong participation, indicating that a moderate increase in the cap is safe.
Moving the cUNI market interest rate model to the model currently in use for other defi tokens will normalize interest rates across similar assets. This change and also allows for the possibility of making additional updates to the cCOMP interest rate curve in the future if necessary, as the cCOMP market will no longer share a common interest rate model contract with other assets.
See discussion in the forum for more details.
03Mismatch analysis
I matched the three decoded actions to the three claims in the description. Action 0 targets the cCOMP cToken address (0x70e36f6BF80a52b3B46b3aF8e106CC0ed743E8e4, the known mainnet cCOMP address) and sets the borrow cap to exactly 150,000 COMP (150000e18), matching the stated increase from 90,750 to 150,000. Action 1 targets the cUNI cToken address (0x35A18000230DA775CAc24873d00Ff85BccdeD550) and sets a new interest rate model, consistent with the claim that cUNI's model is being changed to the shared defi-token model. Action 2 targets the cCOMP cToken again and sets a different interest rate model address than action 1's target, consistent with cCOMP adopting a model distinct from cUNI's new one (i.e., cUNI's prior model, per the description's stated intent that cCOMP takes on cUNI's old rate model while cUNI moves to the AAVE/MKR/YFI/SUSHI model). The addresses used are the well-known, correct mainnet cToken addresses for cCOMP and cUNI, and the borrow cap value converts cleanly to the stated 150,000 COMP figure. No numeric mismatches, no unexplained extra actions, and no omitted significant actions were found. The narrative order in the description (cCOMP first, then cUNI) does not match the calldata's execution order (cUNI's new model set before cCOMP's), but this is purely a sequencing/narrative choice and does not change what is ultimately executed, so it is not flagged as a discrepancy. Overall the description accurately and completely reflects the three on-chain actions.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x3d98…cd3b
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- _setMarketBorrowCaps(address[],uint256[])
- Arguments
{ "0": [ "0x70e36f6BF80a52b3B46b3aF8e106CC0ed743E8e4" ], "1": [ "150000000000000000000000" ] }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x35a1…d550
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- _setInterestRateModel(address)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0xd956188795ca6F4A74092ddca33E0Ea4cA3a1395" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x70e3…e8e4
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- _setInterestRateModel(address)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0xd88B94128Ff2B8Cf2d7886cd1C1E46757418cA2A" }- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
- Update cCOMP Parameters (Borrow Cap and Interest Rate Model) ↗discourse · high confidence
Arguments for
- Increasing the cCOMP borrow cap from 90,750 to 150,000 COMP is justified because organic borrowing demand now consistently hits the cap, suggesting the parameters are no longer optimized and artificially compress borrowing costs.— monet-supply
- The original governance manipulation risk that motivated the borrow cap can now be mitigated by strong voter participation (550,000+ COMP) and existing low proposal thresholds (25,000 COMP), making a higher cap safer.— monet-supply, rleshner
- Adjusting the cCOMP and cUNI interest rate models will improve market dynamics by raising cCOMP yields (especially valuable after removal of COMP supply incentives) and aligning cUNI with prevailing DeFi token rates.— monet-supply
- Gauntlet assessed the market risk implications and found limited market risk concerns with the borrow cap increase from a risk perspective.— pauljlei
- Swapping the interest rate models between cCOMP and cUNI is expedient because cUNI's model is not shared with other markets whereas cCOMP's current model is used across multiple assets, avoiding unintended spillover effects.— monet-supply
Arguments against
None surfaced.
Unresolved concerns
- Whether the cCOMP rate model adjustments were necessary given that moving cUNI to use the existing AAVE/MKR/YFI/SUSHI model and swapping cCOMP to use cUNI's previous model could defer rate optimization until the new borrow cap is actually reached.— monet-supply
- The risk that LP rewards on Balancer/Aura may be discontinued or reduced, which could significantly impact borrowing demand and utilization assumptions underlying the proposal.— monet-supply
Notable participants
- monet-supplyProposal author who identified the market inefficiency, designed the parameter adjustments, and iteratively refined the proposal through community feedback.
- pauljleiGauntlet representative who provided market risk analysis and confirmed limited risk concerns with the borrow cap increase.
- rleshnerCore contributor who validated the historical reasoning behind the original governance risk cap and confirmed that organic utilization mitigates that risk.
- arr00Community member who identified the constraint that the cCOMP rate model is shared with other assets, prompting the proposal redesign.
- dakeshiCommunity participant who voted in favor and provided constructive feedback on improving governance transparency and documentation.