Risk Parameter Changes for FEI: Part 2
01Summary
This proposal winds down the FEI market on Compound by pausing new FEI deposits (minting) and setting the reserve factor to 100%, forcing all FEI borrowers to immediately repay their positions as Tribe DAO enters terminal state.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Set cFEI reserve factor to 100% (from presumably a lower percentage), requiring all interest to be held in reserves(high)
- Pause cFEI minting/supplying, preventing new deposits and forcing existing borrowers to repay immediately(high)
Notable concerns
- FEI borrowers must repay their positions immediately or face forced liquidation
- This is part of Tribe DAO's transition to terminal state, indicating the FEI ecosystem is being deprecated
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Risk Parameter Changes for FEI: Part 2
Simple Summary
A proposal to adjust risk parameters for FEI as follows:
- Pause cFEI minting.
- Set reserve factor to 100%.
Background
Details are provided in the governance forum posts regarding FEI.
Motivation
In light of Tribe DAO’s proposal to enter a terminal state, the FEI market on Compound should be deprecated. Pausing FEI supplying and setting a 100% reserve factor is the second step in winding down the FEI market.
This will allow all borrowing positions to be immediately closed. To avoid having your position closed, we’d recommend FEI borrowers on Compound repay their positions as soon as possible.
Specification
- Sets the cFEI reserve factor to 100% by calling
_setReserveFactoron the cFEI contract - Pauses supplying on cFEI by calling
_setMintPausedon the Comptroller contract
By approving this proposal, you agree that any services provided by Gauntlet shall be governed by the terms of service available at gauntlet.network/tos.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal describes two actions: (1) set cFEI reserve factor to 100% and (2) pause cFEI minting via the Comptroller. The decoded calldata contains exactly two actions matching these: action 0 calls _setReserveFactor with 1000000000000000000 (1e18 = 100% in 18-decimal fixed point) on the cFEI contract address, and action 1 calls _setMintPaused(cFEI, true) on the Comptroller address, which pauses minting for the specified cToken. Both target addresses, function signatures, and parameter values align precisely with the prose description with no numeric or target mismatches. No additional or omitted actions are present. The description accurately and completely reflects the on-chain actions.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x7713…3f67
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- _setReserveFactor(uint256)
- Arguments
{ "0": "1000000000000000000" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0x3d98…cd3b
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- _setMintPaused(address,bool)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0x7713DD9Ca933848F6819F38B8352D9A15EA73F67", "1": true }- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
- Deprecate FEI Market ↗discourse · high confidence
Arguments for
- Since Fei Protocol is winding down, Compound should proactively deprecate the cFEI market by pausing borrowing/supplying and raising the reserve factor to ensure an orderly exit.— monet-supply, pauljlei
- Splitting the deprecation into two phases (pause borrowing first, then later pause supplying and set reserve factor to 100%) gives borrowers adequate notice before facing forced liquidation.— rleshner, monet-supply
- Gauntlet supports the wind-down given that market utilization has already reached 100%.— pauljlei
- Delaying the supply freeze until part 2 would let liquidity-constrained users withdraw sooner while risk-tolerant suppliers capture high APY, and would simplify Morpho's FEI wind down since Morpho borrowers sometimes trigger supplies on Compound.— PaulFrambot
- Moving quickly to set the reserve factor to 100% would let remaining lenders like Volt Protocol exit and consolidate lending activity into the DAI market.— OneTrueKirk
Arguments against
None surfaced.
Unresolved concerns
- Whether the reserves accumulated in the FEI market should be withdrawn and transferred to another market once no longer needed to cover bad debt was raised but not explicitly confirmed as resolved in discussion (though later reserves were reportedly withdrawn).— rleshner
- Uncertainty over how long to wait between phase 1 and phase 2 (30 days suggested) before forcing closure of remaining borrows via 100% reserve factor.— monet-supply, OneTrueKirk
- Concern that remaining borrow positions after weeks of high interest charges may represent forgotten or abandoned accounts rather than active users, raising the question of how to handle them.— OneTrueKirk
Notable participants
- monet-supplyProposer of the FEI market deprecation plan and coordinator who refined the phased approach based on community feedback.
- rleshnerRaised technical considerations about liquidation risk and reserve withdrawal when deprecating a market.
- PaulFrambotSuggested delaying the supply freeze to part 2 to ease liquidity constraints and simplify Morpho's exposure to FEI.
- pauljleiRepresented Gauntlet, expressed support for the proposal, and submitted the on-chain proposals.
- OneTrueKirkRepresented Volt Protocol as the largest remaining lender, repeatedly pushed for timely execution of the reserve factor change and final deprecation.
Generated by Kvorum
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