Optimizing ETH rates
01Summary
Proposal to optimize ETH interest rates on Aave v2 mainnet by adjusting rate curve parameters to accommodate increased borrowing demand from stETH collateral inclusion. Changes include increasing optimal utilization from 65% to 70% and reducing variable rate slope1 from 8 to 3, projected to increase protocol revenue 3-4x while maintaining competitive borrowing rates around 3%.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Increase OPTIMAL_UTILIZATION_RATE from 65 to 70(high)
- Decrease EXCESS_UTILIZATION_RATE from 35 to 30(high)
- Decrease variableRateSlope1 from 8 to 3(high)
- Decrease stableRateSlope1 from 10 to 4(high)
- Maintain baseVariableBorrowRate at 0 and variableRateSlope2 and stableRateSlope2 at 100(medium)
Notable concerns
- Rate optimization assumes stETH will continue generating ~3.9-4% APR from staking rewards
- Projected benefits depend on market conditions supporting 70% utilization targets
- Changes represent significant adjustment to ETH rate curve with potential market impact
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Simple Summary
Optimizing ETH rates on Aave v2 ethereum mainnet to meet the borrowing demands generated from the inclusion of stETH collateral.
Motivation
With the inclusion of new collateral type stETH the borrowing of ETH has increased to an all time high (4-6x more utilization) it is now critical to adjust rates to continue growth under current conditions.
Currently, stETH earns ~3.9% APR from staking rewards, while still being used as collateral in Aave, which allows users to go leverage on stETH while borrowing ETH. This is only sensible to do when ETH borrow rates are lower than stETH rewards. With the current interest modals the utilization has reached up to 19% (an all time high) and can grow further to about 24%. With the above updates it will allow utilization to go up to 70%. Yeilding good returns to users and a 3-4x increase in ETH revenue for the Aave protocol.
Follow the forum post here for more detailed description on calcualations, benefits & risks.
Specification
Proposed updated to ETH rates:
- OPTIMAL_UTILIZATION_RATE = 70 (previously: 65)
- EXCESS_UTILIZATION_RATE = 30 (previously: 35)
- baseVariableBorrowRate = 0 (previously: 0)
- variableRateSlope1 = 3 (previously: 8)
- variableRateSlope2 = 100 (previously: 100)
- stableRateSlope1 = 4 (previously: 10)
- stableRateSlope2 = 100 (previously: 100)
Rationale
Current stETH rewards are 4%. Staking rewards on ETH via Lido are still relatively high and stETH still has the capacity to accept another $4.5B of ETH. This increase in stETH supply would only reduce the rewards by 0.3%, meaning there is at least 1.5M ETH (~$4-5B USD) that could get staked. For Aave, it represents $4-5B in borrowings of ETH (more significant than any borrowing market that currently exists across any token)
Projected rates at current a 3% borrowing rate:
- Utilization: 24.5% [very low utilization leading to less revenue generation]
- Borrowing rate: 3.02%
- Supplying rate: 0.66% [low incentives for new lenders to come in]
Projected rates at 3% borrow rate and 70% utilization:
- Utilization: 70% [good revenue for governance]
- Borrow rate: 3%
- Supplying rate: 1.9% [decent for new lenders to come in or to get a discount for stable coin borrowing against ETH]
See Governance Post here for more detailed description on calcualations, benefits & risks.
Implementation
Here is the new rate strategy. Here is the execution payload.
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal follows the standard Aave governance pattern: a single top-level action that invokes execute() on a pre-deployed payload contract. The actual parameter changes (OPTIMAL_UTILIZATION_RATE, slopes, etc.) described in the prose are implemented inside that payload contract via delegatecall, which is not visible in the decoded calldata provided here — only the outer execute() call is decoded. Because the calldata lacks the granular parameter-setting calls, I cannot directly verify each numeric claim (70%, 30%, 3%, 4%, etc.) against on-chain data from this decoded action alone. There is no evidence of mismatch, target redirection, or omitted/extra actions based on what is available, but the ability to confirm the specific rate values is limited by the opacity of the single execute() call. This results in a 'consistent' assessment (no observed contradiction) but with low confidence due to insufficient decoded detail to fully validate the numeric claims against the payload's internal logic. Delegates should verify the linked payload contract source code directly to confirm the specific parameter values match the proposal text before voting with full confidence.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x49e4…3207
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- fallback()
- Arguments
{}- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
- Optimize rate curve for ETH & improve revenue generation ↗discourse · high confidence
Arguments for
- The surge in ETH utilization driven by stETH collateral demand shows the current ETH interest rate curve is outdated and needs optimization to boost protocol revenue and returns for lenders and borrowers.— samyak, Emilio, eboado, stani
- Targeting a 70% utilization kink balances higher protocol revenue with enough liquidity cushion for ETH withdrawals and incentivizes new ETH suppliers.— samyak, stani, eboado
- Deep stETH/ETH liquidity on Curve and Balancer, plus arbitrage incentives enabled by e-mode, should keep the stETH price stable and ensure sufficient liquidity for liquidations even at higher utilization.— samyak, eboado
- Given community review, the proposed rate parameters are sound enough to proceed promptly with deployment.— eboado
- Independent data analysis (via a Llama dashboard) modeling the effects of the new ETH rate curve supports that the stETH listing and proposed changes have been a revenue success.— MatthewGraham
Arguments against
None surfaced.
Unresolved concerns
- Raising the utilization target too high could reduce available ETH liquidity during liquidations, especially since a large portion of ETH deposits are used as plain collateral, not just for stETH leverage strategies.— eboado
- Given the systemic risk introduced by stETH's currently one-way staking mechanism, the Risk Factor (reserve factor) for ETH may need to be revisited and increased, but this was not further addressed.— stani
- Migrating/listing stETH on Aave v3, which better solves liquidity and risk-modeling issues, was flagged as a priority but left as a future action item rather than resolved in this thread.— eboado
Notable participants
- samyakProposer who authored the analysis and rationale for updating the ETH interest rate curve and responded to feedback.
- eboadoCore contributor who supported the proposal, raised liquidity/risk modeling considerations, and endorsed moving to deployment.
- staniAave founder who endorsed the proposal and suggested revisiting the ETH risk factor for systemic risk.
- EmilioCommunity member who expressed straightforward support for the proposal.
- MatthewGrahamContributor from Llama who provided a follow-up data dashboard analyzing the real-world effects of the rate curve change.
Generated by Kvorum
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