Aavenomics quarterly upgrade Q2 2021
01Summary
This proposal extends the emission end date of AAVE safety incentives (stkAAVE and stkABPT) to 100 years in the future, effectively disabling the fixed end date as a control mechanism and shifting incentive management to emission per second settings. Rewards for current participants will not be lost during the proposal execution process.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Extend the end date of AAVE and AAVE/ETH Safety Module incentives from May 9, 2021 to 100 years in the future(high)
- Shift incentive control mechanism from fixed end date to emission per second parameter(high)
- Maintain continuity of rewards for safety module participants during proposal voting and execution period(medium)
Notable concerns
- Emission incentives will stop on May 9th during the voting period (10 days vote + 7 days timelock) but will restart from where they left off if the proposal passes
- Future ending of AAVE safety incentives will require setting emission per second to 0 rather than relying on a fixed end date
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
AIP Rationale
The bootstrap of the LEND to AAVE migration process and the creation of the Safety Module was configured to set the final day of emission for the 9th of May 2021. The following AIP moves forward the end date of the emission for the AAVE and AAVE/ETH Safety module to continue with the safety incentives program estabilished within the Aavenomics framework. The date will be set 100 years in the future, to effectively disable the emission date as control mechanism and allow the safety incentives to be controlled only using the emission per second (if there will be consensus around ending the AAVE safety incentives, it will be controlled by setting the emission per second to 0). As a consequence of how the incentives system work and the duration of this vote (which will require high consensus, 10 days vote and 7 days timelock) the emission of AAVE incentives will stop on Sunday 9th, but it will restart from where it left if the vote passes (participants of the safety module will not lose any reward as long as they keep staking while the proposal is executed).
AIP Content in short
Extend the end date of the incentives for the Aave Safety module (stkAAVE and stkABPT) 100 years in the future.
Relevant links
AIP-7 implementing the last quarter Aavenomics quarterly schedule: https://app.aave.com/governance/2-QmVrTta734LkhPcbAXLDcob6gk9NFwiEpggQRYHZx8Mr16
- Community-led main Governance thread on the quarterly schedule plan: https://governance.aave.com/t/arc-fees-rewards-how-to-improve-the-aave-token-value/830
- Aavenomics proposal : https://aave.com/aavenomics
Implementation details
[needed]
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal claims to extend the emission end date for the Aave Safety Module (stkAAVE) and stkABPT contracts by 100 years, implemented as a contract upgrade rather than a simple setter, which is the standard Aave pattern for changing immutable DISTRIBUTION_END values baked into the implementation contract. The two decoded actions are both upgradeToAndCall calls on what are presumably the stkAAVE and stkABPT proxy contracts, targeting new implementation addresses and invoking their initializers — this is consistent with the stated goal of extending the incentive end date via an implementation swap. However, the description's 'Implementation details' section is explicitly marked '[needed]' (i.e., left blank), and the calldata does not expose an explicit timestamp parameter that can be independently verified against the '100 years' claim, since that value would be hardcoded in the new implementation bytecode, which we cannot inspect. The overall shape of the transaction (two upgrades, matching the two Safety Module token contracts mentioned) is consistent with the narrative, so I do not see evidence of misdirected funds, wrong targets, or a hidden malicious action. The main caveat is a lack of full verifiability of the specific numeric commitment and the omission of any mention of a full logic upgrade in the prose, both of which are minor given the standard nature of this upgrade pattern for Aave Safety Module parameter changes.}(Note: This closing brace is illustrative and not part of actual output.)
Discrepancies
- lowomitted in description
The description frames the change purely as 'extending the end date' but the actual mechanism is a full proxy implementation upgrade (upgradeToAndCall) for both the stkAAVE and stkABPT contracts. The prose does not mention that new implementation contracts are being deployed and swapped in, which is a more powerful and consequential action than a simple parameter change. The 'Implementation details' section is explicitly left as '[needed]', so this detail was never filled in.
“Extend the end date of the incentives for the Aave Safety module (stkAAVE and stkABPT) 100 years in the future.”
- lowvalue mismatch
The specific '100 years in the future' end-date parameter is not visible in the decoded calldata (the initialize calls carry no explicit timestamp argument that could be cross-checked); the actual end date is presumably hardcoded in the bytecode of the new implementation contracts (0xe42F...523d2f and 0x7183...93e8), which cannot be verified from the calldata alone.
“The date will be set 100 years in the future”
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x4da2…70f5
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0xe42F02713aEC989132C1755117F768DBEa523d2f", "1": "0x8129fc1c" }- Calldata
- Target
- 0xa111…fb47
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)
- Arguments
{ "0": "0x7183143a9e223A12a83d1E28c98f7D01a68993e8", "1": "0x1624f6c600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" }- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
| Voter | Choice | % of total | Rationale | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4A0x4a49…02f3 | For | 2.7M | 81.57% | — | 6y ago |
| DD0xdd70…8202 | For | 183.5K | 5.53% | — | 6y ago |
| 9B0x9b5e…0499 | For | 100.7K | 3.04% | — | 6y ago |
| 360x36c4…2a8a | For | 78.3K | 2.36% | — | 6y ago |
| 5B0x5bc9…d76c | For | 76.3K | 2.30% | — | 6y ago |
| 700x704d…a0df | For | 50.6K | 1.53% | — | 6y ago |
| 990x990d…f1c2 | For | 47K | 1.42% | — | 6y ago |
| 800x80dc…c146 | For | 27.4K | 0.82% | — | 6y ago |
| ED0xed90…bc48 | For | 9.3K | 0.28% | — | 6y ago |
| 4C0x4ca3…dce6 | For | 7K | 0.21% | — | 6y ago |
| 010x0154…6f6e | For | 6.7K | 0.20% | — | 6y ago |
| 1F0x1f8d…84b4 | For | 4.3K | 0.13% | — | 6y ago |
| 970x9757…e331 | For | 4K | 0.12% | — | 6y ago |
| 500x50db…207c | For | 3.8K | 0.11% | — | 6y ago |
| 360x36cf…b25f | For | 2K | 0.06% | — | 6y ago |
| 880x880c…abe6 | For | 1.5K | 0.05% | — | 6y ago |
| C70xc79d…7d0d | For | 1.4K | 0.04% | — | 6y ago |
| 440x44e5…8ed3 | For | 1.3K | 0.04% | — | 6y ago |
| A50xa550…668f | For | 1.1K | 0.03% | — | 6y ago |
| F70xf7ea…938c | For | 1K | 0.03% | — | 6y ago |
| D10xd130…b75e | For | 808.9 | 0.02% | — | 6y ago |
| 800x80ee…e12e | For | 548.4 | 0.02% | — | 6y ago |
| 4A0x4ada…1c6b | For | 333.5 | 0.01% | — | 6y ago |
| 490x49d2…4399 | For | 262 | 0.01% | — | 6y ago |
| C10xc179…8cca | For | 251 | 0.01% | — | 6y ago |
| 820x82bb…f7c2 | For | 250.8 | 0.01% | — | 6y ago |
| EB0xeb56…67c0 | For | 250.8 | 0.01% | — | 6y ago |
| 470x479e…7d16 | For | 247.5 | 0.01% | — | 6y ago |
| 300x3002…8db4 | For | 102.7 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| A30xa334…e701 | For | 101 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 280x2875…63e9 | For | 84.7 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 7F0x7f18…caed | For | 72 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 990x99d7…1f39 | For | 68.2 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| A80xa8de…eb28 | For | 63.9 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 030x037d…92ff | For | 50.2 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 740x7439…c66e | For | 50 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 8D0x8d07…a265 | For | 50 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 300x304c…7288 | For | 48.5 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 3C0x3c0a…a7b8 | For | 45.3 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| C90xc90d…5042 | For | 31.3 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| DF0xdf8a…21ca | For | 27.9 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| AD0xad6c…bd37 | For | 22 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 100x10d6…7178 | For | 21.8 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 6B0x6bac…342c | For | 21 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 720x723d…a43e | For | 16.5 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| EB0xebf9…2d8f | For | 13.9 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 070x07da…fcf1 | For | 5.9 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| B30xb302…8301 | For | 5.5 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| 320x32ca…c384 | For | 4.1 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
| EB0xeb7a…2ada | For | 2.9 | 0.00% | — | 6y ago |
07Forum
- ARC - Fees & Rewards: How to improve the $AAVE token value? ↗discourse · high confidence
Arguments for
- The protocol should introduce new fee sources (origination fees, higher liquidation fees, rate-switching fees, collateral-swap fees, credit delegation fees) to generate sustainable revenue as V2 launches.— Dydymoon, EmmanuelD, Laur, Gaurav
- A DAO treasury separate from the Ecosystem Reserve should be built up from protocol fees to fund grants, safety, and long-term growth, potentially even acting as a VC-style investment vehicle.— Dydymoon, Emilio, depressedape, drew
- V2's reserve factor design (minting aTokens to governance) is a powerful, technically sound mechanism that makes the DAO an active participant in the protocol and enables credit delegation for growth.— Emilio, Dydymoon
- Incentives should be aligned between stakers and liquidity providers via a compounding bonus that rewards those who restake rewards into the Safety Module rather than sell.— Dydymoon, Emilio, Zer0dot
- An eventual LEND-to-AAVE migration deadline is reasonable to eliminate confusion and reduce circulating supply, once remaining tokens are addressed.— Dydymoon, EmmanuelD, Gaurav
- The overall proposal is well-structured, thoughtful, and a good long-term vision for Aavenomics worth advancing toward a formal AIP.— EzR3aL, Crodders, Blackmagic96, Granpiks, oaksprout
Arguments against
- Origination and feature fees risk 'double taxation' of users and could drive borrowers/liquidity away from Aave, especially compared to fee-free competitors like Compound.— Zer0dot, Emilio
- Raising the flash loan fee from 0.09% is unnecessary and could undermine Aave's competitive advantage in flash loan liquidity and low fees.— Zer0dot, Dydymoon
- Setting a short migration deadline (e.g., end of year) is unfair to less-engaged or small token holders and effectively confiscates their funds; it should remain open-ended or set far in the future.— Sunshine, EzR3aL, DefiAnt, Zer0dot
- Depositing treasury funds into external farming protocols (e.g., Yearn) introduces unnecessary counterparty and smart contract risk and should be avoided in favor of keeping treasury funds within the protocol.— Zer0dot
Unresolved concerns
- No consensus was reached on exact fee percentages for origination, liquidation, rate-switching, or collateral-swap features.— Dydymoon, Zer0dot, Laur
- Whether and when to impose a LEND migration deadline, and how to handle lost or inactive ICO tokens fairly, remained unresolved.— Sunshine, DefiAnt, EzR3aL
- The technical feasibility and design of an auto-compounding staking function was raised but never confirmed as implemented or scheduled.— Dydymoon, Emilio
- How exactly treasury funds should be deployed (internal-only vs. external yield farming vs. an 'Aave Investment Bank') was debated without resolution.— Dydymoon, Zer0dot, depressedape
- Details of V2's actual fee and incentive implementation remained vague, with participants requesting more concrete information.— fresiastyle, oaksprout
Notable participants
- DydymoonOriginal proposer who laid out the full Aavenomics framework and actively responded to community feedback throughout the thread.
- EmmanuelDCo-author of the proposal who clarified scope and defended long-term fee and treasury strategy.
- EmilioCore technical contributor who explained V2's reserve factor, aToken treasury mechanics, and staking bonus implementation.
- Zer0dotProvided the most detailed critical feedback, challenging fee design, flash loan fee increases, and treasury farming strategy.
- SunshineRaised strong ethical objections to imposing a short migration deadline on less-engaged token holders.
- DefiAntWarned that a short migration deadline was legally and reputationally risky, suggesting a much longer timeline instead.
- depressedapeProposed the idea of using the treasury as a long-term VC-style investment vehicle.
- EzR3aLFrequent supportive voice who also pushed back on the migration deadline.
- oaksproutRaised a process concern about whether the post qualified as an actual AIP, prompting clarification.
Generated by Kvorum
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