Aave v2 ETH Interest Rate Curve Update
01Summary
Llama proposes adjusting ETH interest rate parameters on Aave v2 and v3 to improve capital efficiency and DAO revenue. Key changes include increasing Uoptimal from 70% to 80%, raising Slope1 from 3% to 5.75%, reducing Slope2 from 100 to 80, and increasing Reserve Factor from 10% to 15%. This is expected to increase v2 ETH revenue from ~$5.5k to ~$13.1k per day.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Increase Uoptimal parameter from 70% to 80% for ETH variable and stable rates on v2 and v3(medium)
- Increase Slope1 (interest rate at Uoptimal point) from 3% to 5.75% for variable rates, enabling recursive ETH/wstETH strategies to break even within less volatile Slope 1(high)
- Reduce Slope2 from 100 to 80 for variable rates, adjusting the gradient of the second part of the yield curve(medium)
- Increase Reserve Factor from 10% to 15%, directing more interest revenue to Aave DAO(high)
- Apply identical interest rate parameter changes to both Aave v2 and v3 to equalize yields and improve utilization across deployments(high)
Notable concerns
- Revenue generation depends on utilization behavior changing as expected; actual outcomes may differ if market conditions differ from assumptions
- Proposal increases costs for borrowers through higher interest rates on ETH
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Simple Summary
Llama recommends amending the ETH interest rate parameters on the Aave Ethereum v2 and v3 Liquidity Pool.
Abstract
With Aave v3 about to be deployed and a wstETH and ETH eMode likely, the ETH Interest Rate Curve should be adjusted such that the looped recursive strategy breaks even within Slope 1, where the Interest Rate changes are less volatile.
The new interest rate curve has an Interest Rate of 5.75% at the Uoptimal point, which is 25 bps more than stETH yield at the time of writing. This proposal will lead to improved capital efficiency of the ETH Reserve and will generate more revenue for the DAO when compared to replicating the existing v2 Interest Rate curve on v3 with the introduction of an ETH eMode Category.
For the existing v2 market, Llama suggests adopting the same Interest Rate parameters that are being being proposed on v3. This will enable the ETH yields across the markets to somewhat equalize, leading to higher utilization of the ETH Reserve and more revenue for the DAO.
Motivation
By changing the Interest Rate at the Uopotimal point from 3% to 5.75%, when an eMode for ETH and wstETH is created on Aave v3, the recursive strategy will break even prior to reaching the Uoptimal utilization within the Reserve. This is a desirable feature as the volatility of the Interest Rate on Slope 1 is less than Slope 2.
By setting the Slope 1 parameter at 5.75% (25 bps greater than the current annual wstETH yield), utilization in the Reserve is not expected to reach the Uoptimal level for any prolonged period of time.
By reducing the Slope 2 parameter from 100 to 80, the gradient of the second part of the yield curve increases due to an increase in Uoptimal from 70% to 80%. This is subtle and can be seen in the chart below. The Base Rate for the existing Interest Rate and proposed Interest Rate is unchanged at 0%.
With the recommended new Interest Rate curve for the v3 deployment, it is reasonable to expect the yield across the v2 and v3 deployment to be arbitraged. If the yield on the v3 deployment converges to the wstETH rate, then this will shift the v2 Reserve utilization beyond the Uoptimal level set at 3%.
Llama recommendeds changing the v2 Interest Rate to match the v3 deployment Interest Rate. This way, both v2 and v3 Reserves will experience utilization along the Slope 1 portion of the Interest Rate curve whilst also benefiting from improved capital efficiency.
The graphic below shows the changes in the interest rate.

This proposal increases the Reserve Factor from 10% to 15%, directing 15% of the interest paid to Aave DAO. When combined with the Interest Rate changes, the v2 deployment will generate an estimated $13.1k per day, up from around $5.5k per day.
Prior to this proposal, due the implementation of AIP-68, Aave DAO is earning less revenue from the ETH Reserve post-merge despite utilization within the Reserve increasing significantly over that time.
Specification
The below table shows the current and proposed changes to the ETH Reserve on Ethereum v2 and Ethereum v3 when deployed.
| Parameter | Current Variable (%) | Proposed Variable (%) | Current Stable (%) | Proposed Stable (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uoptimal | 70 | 80 | 70 | 80 |
| Base | 0 | 0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Slope1 | 3.0 | 5.75 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Slope2 | 100 | 80 | 100 | 80 |
| Reserve Factor | 10 | 15 | 10 | 15 |
Implementation
Test cases can be found here
Payload Implementation can be found here
Proposal Payload = 0x98bc9dfa3cecb37f1bdeadc6e774d39082756b19
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal executes a single delegatecall to the Proposal Payload contract's execute() function, which is the standard pattern used in Aave governance for bundling multiple interest-rate-strategy updates into one on-chain call. The decoded action does not expose the internal calls the payload makes (e.g., setReserveInterestRateStrategyAddress, setReserveFactor) because those are encoded in the payload contract's bytecode rather than passed as calldata arguments to the governance action itself. As a result, I cannot directly verify the specific numeric parameters (Uoptimal 70->80%, Slope1 3%->5.75%, Slope2 100->80, Reserve Factor 10%->15%) against on-chain calldata — there is simply no decoded argument data to compare. This is a common and expected pattern for this type of proposal (Llama/Aave risk parameter updates), and the description's level of detail is typical of these payload-based proposals with linked source code and audited test cases for verification off-chain. Given the lack of decoded internal actions, I default to a low-confidence, consistent assessment rather than flagging unverifiable specifics as discrepancies, per the guidance to avoid false alarms when the calldata cannot be meaningfully compared to the prose. No evidence contradicts the description, and no additional actions (like fund transfers or role grants) appear beyond the expected single payload execution call.'
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x98bc…6b19
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- fallback()
- Arguments
{}- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
| Voter | Choice | % of total | Rationale | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C40xc4a9…2935 | For | 92.5K | 20.03% | — | 4y ago |
| DC0xdc1f…e432 | For | 90K | 19.48% | — | 4y ago |
| 620x62a4…816a | For | 81K | 17.54% | — | 4y ago |
| B80xb83b…cf5c | For | 80K | 17.32% | — | 4y ago |
| 730x732a…b848 | For | 46.6K | 10.08% | — | 4y ago |
| B80xb8c2…4f87 | For | 19.2K | 4.16% | — | 4y ago |
| 160x1664…36d9 | For | 16.9K | 3.66% | — | 4y ago |
| 320x329c…3ed4 | For | 10.6K | 2.30% | — | 4y ago |
| 7A0x7ae1…e585 | For | 10K | 2.16% | — | 4y ago |
| 5B0x5b3b…7c98 | For | 5.9K | 1.27% | — | 4y ago |
| 9A0x9a76…7623 | For | 4.8K | 1.04% | — | 4y ago |
| 5A0x5af2…89d0 | For | 2.8K | 0.61% | — | 4y ago |
| 750x75e3…f20c | For | 1.3K | 0.28% | — | 4y ago |
| 580x58ac…a73d | For | 113.8 | 0.02% | — | 4y ago |
| B50xb5bf…cdc9 | For | 42.2 | 0.01% | — | 4y ago |
| EA0xea17…6676 | For | 36.8 | 0.01% | — | 4y ago |
| 5E0x5ef9…4c80 | For | 36.6 | 0.01% | — | 4y ago |
| E10xe13a…2017 | For | 20 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 790x799c…9cf8 | For | 18.9 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 000x002e…8c32 | For | 10 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| AD0xad03…bd9b | For | 9 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| A00xa0ef…2d56 | For | 8.3 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| FC0xfca9…46ca | For | 5 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 680x6831…4c49 | For | 2.4 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| EB0xeb6f…229b | For | 1.6 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 7B0x7b0b…abde | For | 1.5 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 8D0x8d4f…e608 | For | 1.2 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 6C0x6c4a…acdb | For | 1.1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| EC0xecd0…6d74 | For | 1.1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| B40xb46c…3b1b | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 7E0x7e52…9706 | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| E90xe97b…922c | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 1A0x1aab…65dd | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| C40xc49a…a921 | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 040x0490…a206 | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| E90xe95c…32dc | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 380x38f8…bf5b | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 970x97a1…c549 | For | 1 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 110x1120…41f8 | For | 0.8 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| FC0xfcd0…3714 | For | 0.6 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| D30xd3d8…5d68 | For | 0.5 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 3D0x3dd8…7844 | For | 0.4 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| F20xf23e…db28 | For | 0.3 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| A50xa5fe…9906 | For | 0.3 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| F90xf9e1…851e | For | 0.3 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 0D0x0d95…2392 | For | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 980x98be…d2c5 | For | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 7D0x7d2e…6f47 | For | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 3F0x3f8e…34be | For | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
| 250x2537…ddec | For | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 4y ago |
07Forum
- Optimize rate curve for ETH & improve revenue generation ↗discourse · high confidence
Arguments for
- The surge in ETH utilization driven by stETH collateral demand shows the current ETH interest rate curve is outdated and needs optimization to boost protocol revenue and returns for lenders and borrowers.— samyak, Emilio, eboado, stani
- Targeting a 70% utilization kink balances higher protocol revenue with enough liquidity cushion for ETH withdrawals and incentivizes new ETH suppliers.— samyak, stani, eboado
- Deep stETH/ETH liquidity on Curve and Balancer, plus arbitrage incentives enabled by e-mode, should keep the stETH price stable and ensure sufficient liquidity for liquidations even at higher utilization.— samyak, eboado
- Given community review, the proposed rate parameters are sound enough to proceed promptly with deployment.— eboado
- Independent data analysis (via a Llama dashboard) modeling the effects of the new ETH rate curve supports that the stETH listing and proposed changes have been a revenue success.— MatthewGraham
Arguments against
None surfaced.
Unresolved concerns
- Raising the utilization target too high could reduce available ETH liquidity during liquidations, especially since a large portion of ETH deposits are used as plain collateral, not just for stETH leverage strategies.— eboado
- Given the systemic risk introduced by stETH's currently one-way staking mechanism, the Risk Factor (reserve factor) for ETH may need to be revisited and increased, but this was not further addressed.— stani
- Migrating/listing stETH on Aave v3, which better solves liquidity and risk-modeling issues, was flagged as a priority but left as a future action item rather than resolved in this thread.— eboado
Notable participants
- samyakProposer who authored the analysis and rationale for updating the ETH interest rate curve and responded to feedback.
- eboadoCore contributor who supported the proposal, raised liquidity/risk modeling considerations, and endorsed moving to deployment.
- staniAave founder who endorsed the proposal and suggested revisiting the ETH risk factor for systemic risk.
- EmilioCommunity member who expressed straightforward support for the proposal.
- MatthewGrahamContributor from Llama who provided a follow-up data dashboard analyzing the real-world effects of the rate curve change.
Generated by Kvorum
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