KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governance v3 · #511

Risk Stewards Cooldown Reduction & Umbrella Pauser Role Reassignment

executedAug 25, 2026, 02:50 PM UTCby660x66a2…73ff

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

This proposal makes two operational changes to Aave's risk management: (1) reduces the Risk Steward minimum delay from 72 hours to 36 hours for six interest rate and cap parameters (supply cap, borrow cap, baseVariableBorrowRate, variableRateSlope1, variableRateSlope2, optimalUsageRatio) across multiple deployments to enable faster response to legitimate organic growth while maintaining safety bounds; (2) reassigns the Aave Umbrella pause role from the Aave Governance Executor to the Aave Protocol Guardian (the standing 4-of-7 emergency multisig) to enable faster emergency pauses of staked

Type
governance change

Key changes

  • Risk Steward minDelay reduced from 72 hours to 36 hours for supply cap, borrow cap, baseVariableBorrowRate, variableRateSlope1, variableRateSlope2, and optimalUsageRatio parameters across 17 market deployments(high)
  • Collateral and E-Mode parameters (ltv, liquidationThreshold, liquidationBonus, eMode ltv, eMode liquidationThreshold, eMode liquidationBonus) remain at 72-hour minimum delay(medium)
  • maxPercentChange bounds unchanged on all parameters(low)
  • PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE on Umbrella controller granted to Aave Protocol Guardian to enable emergency pause/unpause of stkTokens without full AIP cycle(high)
  • DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and configuration roles on Umbrella remain with Aave Governance Executor for token creation and parameter changes(medium)

Notable concerns

  • Faster 36-hour cooldown could increase operational risk if caps are adjusted prematurely, though maxPercentChange bounds remain unchanged to limit magnitude of single changes
  • Pause and unpause authority consolidated in Protocol Guardian multisig rather than split, meaning emergency unpause decisions bypass governance
  • Change applies across 17 different market deployments creating complexity in testing and verification
Contracts0x13a9CC64344b02bACC5AD9Cf38B5711F1B9ec3d40xD400fc38ED4732893174325693a63C30ee3881a80x6bf183243FdD1e306ad2C4450BC7dcf6f0bf8Aa60xA484Ab92fe32B143AEE7019fC1502b1dAA522D310xaAFD07D53A7365D3e9fb6F3a3B09EC19676B73Ce0x4f827A63755855cDf3e8f3bcD20265C833f15033
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profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
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02Description

1,531 words

Simple Summary

This ARFC operationalises two changes surfaced after the active incident response management over the past months. First, the Risk Steward minDelay is reduced from 72 hours to 36 hours on six cap and IRM parameters where the conservative cap posture meaningfully constrains response speed. Second, the pause role on Aave Umbrella stkTokens is reassigned to the Aave Protocol Guardian, the standing Aave-wide emergency multisig that already holds pause and freeze authority across Aave deployments, with all other Umbrella governance action permissions remaining with the Aave Governance Executor.

The cooldown change addresses a friction surfaced over the past month as LlamaRisk has tightened supply and borrow caps on listed assets closer to their current utilisation. This conservative cap posture is the principal lever Aave has used to bound exposure. It has, however, a structural side effect: when caps sit close to organic demand, the 72-hour Risk Steward cooldown becomes a binding constraint on the next cap raise after the demand suddenly increases, turning the defensive posture into a blocker on healthy growth. Reducing minDelay to 36 hours on the six cap and IRM parameters relieves this constraint without weakening any maxPercentChange bound.

In parallel, Umbrella pause reassignment addresses the operational friction observed when stkwaWETH had to be paused during the rsETH incident response. The PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE on Umbrella (which governs both pause and unpause) currently sits behind the Aave Governance Executor rather than behind Aave's standing emergency body, which meant the action had to be routed through a full AIP cycle. Reassigning PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE to the Aave Protocol Guardian, the multisig that already holds emergency pause authority across the rest of the protocol, restores the role assignment originally specified at Umbrella's activation and ensures that future stkToken pauses can be executed at incident response speed. Configuration authority on Umbrella (token creation, parameter changes, role management under DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) remains solely with the Aave Governance Executor.

Motivation

On the Risk Stewards, the more conservative cap posture taken over the past month limits the operational levers available to balance the protocol's needs and safety. When caps are sized closer to current utilisation, legitimate organic growth on a healthy asset more frequently bumps into the 72-hour Risk Steward cooldown. The defensive posture, intended to keep collateral exposure under control, turns into a cap on legitimate organic flow.

On Umbrella, the [Direct-to-AIP] Pause stkwaWETH Umbrella Staked Token on Ethereum V3 had to be proposed through a full governance vote because pause authority on Umbrella currently sits behind the Aave Governance Executor, rather than Aave's standing emergency pause body. This is a direct departure from the role assignment specified in the [ARFC] Aave Umbrella - activation proposal, which explicitly stated that emergency pause and unpause authority would belong to the Aave Protocol Guardian.

Part 1: Risk Stewards Cooldown Reduction

Background

The current Risk Steward RiskConfig enforces per-parameter constraints, where:

  • minDelay is the minimum time between consecutive changes to the same parameter on the same reserve.
  • maxPercentChange is the largest single-step change accepted, with semantics that vary by parameter: collateral and rate parameters use absolute difference bounds, cap parameters use relative difference of the current cap.

The proposed change reduces minDelay from 72 hours to 36 hours on the six cap and IRM parameters where the defensive cap posture meaningfully constrains response speed. The higher-impact collateral and E-Mode parameters (base LTV, LT, LB and their E-Mode equivalents, both price caps) stay at the 72-hour minimum because changes there have a larger downstream effect on existing positions. The Pendle discount rate stays at its existing 48-hour minimum, already tighter than the cap and IRM cadence proposed here. maxPercentChange bounds are unchanged across every parameter under this proposal.

The intent is symmetric with the previewed Cap Oracle defensive automation: a faster downward path on caps through the oracle automatization, and a faster upward path on caps and rates through tighter manual cadence, so that the defensive cap posture does not turn into a soft cap on legitimate organic growth.

Proposed Configuration Change

ParameterCurrent minDelayCurrent maxPercentChangeProposed minDelay
ltv72h50 bps (0.50% absolute)-
liquidationThreshold72h50 bps (0.50% absolute)-
liquidationBonus72h50 bps (0.50% absolute)-
eMode ltv72h50 bps (0.50% absolute)-
eMode liquidationThreshold72h10 bps (0.10% absolute)-
eMode liquidationBonus72h50 bps (0.50% absolute)-
baseVariableBorrowRate72h100 bps (1.00% absolute)36h
variableRateSlope172h100 bps (1.00% absolute)36h
variableRateSlope272h2000 bps (20.00% absolute)36h
optimalUsageRatio72h300 bps (3.00% absolute)36h
supplyCap72h10000 bps (100% relative)36h
borrowCap72h10000 bps (100% relative)36h
priceCapLst72h500 bps (5.00% relative)-
priceCapStable72h50 bps (0.50% relative)-
discountRatePendle48h2.50% absolute-

Part 2: Umbrella Pause Guardian Reassignment

Background

Umbrella was deployed with pause and configuration changes routed through the UmbrellaEthereum PERMISSIONED_PAYLOADS_CONTROLLER (0xF86F77F7531B3374274E3f725E0A81D60bC4bB67) and its executor (0x2759de67aD133C747C9f41d56F1b8A343cE679a1). In practice this means any pause action on an Umbrella stkToken requires a full AIP cycle, which is what happened during the rsETH response when stkwaWETH had to be paused.

The original role specification in the [ARFC] Aave Umbrella - activation proposal assigned StakeToken pause to the Aave Protocol Guardian, listing under "Permissioned actions & roles" the explicit line "Emergency pause and unpause: Aave Protocol Guardian." The current Umbrella deployment does not reflect that assignment.

The Aave Protocol Guardian on Ethereum Core is Aave's standing emergency multisig. It is a community-elected 4-of-7 multisig, and it already holds emergency authority on Aave's other safety surfaces, including market pause and reserve freeze across Aave deployments and emergency-mode actions on cross-chain messaging. Reassigning Umbrella pause to this multisig consolidates Aave's emergency authority under the body that exists for exactly this purpose, restores the role assignment originally specified at Umbrella's activation, and removes the AIP-cycle bottleneck observed during the rsETH response.

Proposed Reassignment

The role separation in this proposal runs along the emergency vs. configuration axis rather than along pause vs. unpause. The Umbrella contract uses OpenZeppelin AccessControl, and pauseStk and unpauseStk on UmbrellaStkManager are both protected by a single PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE that cannot be split between two holders. Pause and unpause therefore move together, and the question is which body should hold that combined emergency role.

PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE is assigned to the Aave Protocol Guardian, the standing 4-of-7 Aave-wide emergency multisig described above. This adheres the assignment specified in the activation ARFC, removes the AIP-cycle bottleneck on pause action, and aligns Umbrella with the body that already holds emergency authority on Aave's other safety surfaces. Because pause and unpause are bound to the same role, the Protocol Guardian also holds unpause: reversing an precautious pause does not require a governance vote, which is consistent with how emergency pause and unpause work on other Aave surfaces today.

DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and the remaining configuration roles on Umbrella stay with the Aave Governance Executor. This covers token creation, parameter changes, asset onboarding to Umbrella, modification of coverage scope, role grants and revocations, and any other deliberate configuration action. These remain on the AIP cadence, where they belong.

Stake Tokens in Scope

PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE is held on the Umbrella controller and is used to pause and unpause individual stkTokens via the pauseStk(address) and unpauseStk(address) entry points. Granting the role at the controller is sufficient to cover all current and future stkTokens managed by the controller. The currently deployed Ethereum stkTokens are:

Stake tokenAddress
stkwaUSDC0x6bf183243FdD1e306ad2C4450BC7dcf6f0bf8Aa6
stkwaUSDT0xA484Ab92fe32B143AEE7019fC1502b1dAA522D31
stkwaWETH0xaAFD07D53A7365D3e9fb6F3a3B09EC19676B73Ce
stkGHO0x4f827A63755855cDf3e8f3bcD20265C833f15033

Specification

  • Grant PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE on the Umbrella controller (0xD400fc38ED4732893174325693a63C30ee3881a8) to the Aave Protocol Guardian (0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30) on Ethereum Mainnet. This authorises the Protocol Guardian to call pauseStk(stkToken) and unpauseStk(stkToken) on every stkToken currently managed by the controller and any future stkToken added under it.
  • On the Risk Steward RiskConfig, set minDelay to 36 hours on baseVariableBorrowRate, variableRateSlope1, variableRateSlope2, optimalUsageRatio, supplyCap, and borrowCap (reduced from 72 hours).

Amendment

For the purpose of clarity at the AIP implementation phase, the following list of market deployments are to be affected by this change:

  • Ethereum (Core, Lido, and EtherFi deployments)
  • Polygon
  • Avalanche
  • Arbitrum
  • Optimism
  • Base
  • Gnosis
  • BNB Chain
  • Scroll
  • Linea
  • Sonic
  • Celo
  • Mantle
  • Plasma
  • MegaETH
  • Monad
  • X Layer

References

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorum

A calldata-vs-description analysis is not generated yet. Review the decoded actions →

04Actions

3 total
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05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters0
VP participating0
Outcome (current)—
Current support—

06Voters

0 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

AIForum synthesis by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5
sentiment · favorablethread · constructive

Arguments for

  • Reducing Risk Steward cooldown from 72h to 36h on cap and IRM parameters improves operational responsiveness without expanding risk boundaries, as maxPercentChange limits remain unchanged.— LlamaRisk, Abel189
  • Conservative cap posture intended to limit exposure should not become a blocker on legitimate organic growth of healthy assets.— LlamaRisk
  • Reassigning Umbrella pause role to Aave Protocol Guardian enables emergency response at incident speed rather than requiring a full AIP governance cycle.— LlamaRisk, Abel189
  • Protocol Guardian reassignment restores the original role assignment specified in the Umbrella activation ARFC.— LlamaRisk, Abel189
  • Higher-impact collateral and E-Mode parameters maintain the 72-hour minimum, preserving stronger controls on parameters with larger downstream effects on existing positions.— LlamaRisk

Arguments against

None surfaced.

Notable participants

  • LlamaRiskProposal author presenting the rationale for both cooldown reduction and pause role reassignment with detailed technical justification.
  • Abel189Early supporter expressing agreement with both proposed changes and their risk-control design.
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