Remote GSM Launch: Monad
01Summary
Deploy a GHO Stability Module (GSM) on Monad using USDC, funded by minting 50M GHO on Ethereum and bridging it via CCIP to seed a GhoReserve on Monad. This implements the RemoteGSM architecture, enabling GSM deployment on L2s where GHO cannot be minted directly.
- Type
- protocol addition
Key changes
- Mint 50M GHO via dedicated GhoDirectFacilitator on Ethereum(high)
- Bridge 50M GHO to Monad over CCIP to seed GhoReserve(high)
- Raise GHO CCIP bridge limit permanently by 50M across all networks(high)
- Deploy USDC GSM on Monad with 25M GHO reserve limit and 40M underlying exposure cap(high)
- Set GSM fees at 0% sell / 0.10% buy(medium)
- Grant LIMIT_MANAGER_ROLE on Monad GhoReserve to Risk Council(medium)
- Temporarily widen Ethereum-Monad CCIP lane rate limiter for 50M seed transfer, then restore(medium)
- Raise CCIP token-pool facilitator bucket capacity by 50M on Arbitrum, Avalanche, Base, Gnosis, Mantle, Ink, Plasma, and X-Layer(low)
Notable concerns
- Multi-part execution with strict ordering requirements; Monad Part 1 must execute before CCIP message arrives or manual retry required
- Ethereum Part 2 execution must occur at least 1 second after Part 1 due to outbound bucket refill time
- Post-execution manual registration of OracleSwapFreezer via SAFE required
- Complexity across 10 blockchain deployments with interdependent state changes
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Simple Summary
Launch a GHO GSM on Monad (USDC) using the RemoteGSM architecture. The proposal mints 50M GHO via a dedicated GhoDirectFacilitator on Ethereum, bridges it to Monad over CCIP to seed the local GhoReserve, and wires up the Monad USDC GSM.
Motivation
The RemoteGSM upgrade refactors GHO's stability mechanism into a three-layer design (GhoDirectFacilitator → GhoReserve → GSM), removing the prior requirement that each GSM be its own GHO facilitator and unlocking GSM deployment on L2s, where GHO cannot be minted directly. Deploying a USDC GSM on Monad extends GHO's stability surface to a new network while keeping mint and bridge control under DAO governance.
Specification
Fund the Monad GHO Reserve
On Ethereum:
- Raise the GHO CCIP bridge limit by 50M (permanent: the bridged 50M becomes part of the locked supply) and temporarily widen the Monad-lane outbound rate limiter to fit the one-off 50M GHO transfer.
- Register a Monad-scoped
GhoDirectFacilitatoron the GHO token with a 50M bucket capacity. - Mint 50M GHO into the payload and bridge it to Monad via
AaveGhoCcipBridge(configuring the Monad destination lane first). - After bridging, restore the Ethereum ↔ Monad lane rate-limit config to its prior value. No other lane is modified.
On Monad:
- Raise the CCIP token-pool facilitator bucket capacity by 50M.
- Temporarily raise the Ethereum-lane inbound rate limiter to receive the 50M GHO.
- On receipt, the
Collectorforwards the 50M GHO to theGhoReserve. - After bridging, restore the Monad ↔ Ethereum lane rate-limit config to its prior value.
Wire up Monad GSM (USDC)
For the GSM:
- Point it at the
GhoReserve, enroll it as an entity with a 25M GHO reserve limit. - Grant
SWAP_FREEZER_ROLEto the asset'sOracleSwapFreezerand to the Monad executor. - Register it in the
GsmRegistryand grantCONFIGURATOR_ROLEto theGhoGsmSteward. - Set the initial exposure cap to 40M of the underlying (6 decimals) and attach the 0% sell / 0.10% buy fee strategy (selling the underlying for GHO is free; buying it back with GHO costs 0.10%).
LIMIT_MANAGER_ROLE on the Monad GhoReserve is granted to the Monad Risk Council.
GHO CCIP lane capacity
GHO CCIP lane rate-limit capacities are kept the same as before execution. The proposal only widens the Ethereum ↔ Monad lane temporarily to move the 50M seed, then restores it. The remaining networks (Arbitrum, Avalanche, Base, Gnosis, Mantle, Plasma, X-Layer, Ink) only increase their CCIP token-pool facilitator bucket capacity by 50M to account for the newly minted supply; their lane rate limits are not touched.
Execution Order
Execution order:
- Ethereum Part 1 — raises the bridge limit and the Eth→Monad outbound rate limiter.
- Ethereum Part 2 — mints 50M GHO via the new GhoDirectFacilitator and bridges it. Reverts if executed within the same second as Part 1 (the outbound bucket needs ~1s to refill).
- Monad Part 1 must execute before the CCIP message arrives, otherwise the inbound rate limit / facilitator bucket rejects the mint and the delivery has to be manually retried on https://ccip.chain.link/.
- Monad Part 2 — reverts until the bridged GHO reaches the Collector.
- The remaining network payloads (Arbitrum, Avalanche, Base, Gnosis, Ink, Mantle, Plasma, X-Layer) are independent and can execute any time.
- Manually register OracleSwapFreezer via SAFE post execution.
References
- Implementation: AaveV3Ethereum_Part 1, AaveV3Ethereum_Part 2, AaveV3Monad_Part 1, AaveV3Monad_Part 2, AaveV3Arbitrum, AaveV3Avalanche, AaveV3Base, AaveV3Gnosis, AaveV3Mantle, AaveV3Ink, AaveV3Plasma, AaveV3XLayer
- Tests: AaveV3Ethereum_Part 1, AaveV3Ethereum_Part 2, AaveV3Monad_Part 1, AaveV3Monad_Part 2, AaveV3Arbitrum, AaveV3Avalanche, AaveV3Base, AaveV3Gnosis, AaveV3Mantle, AaveV3Ink, AaveV3Plasma, AaveV3XLayer
- Snapshot
- Discussion
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
03Mismatch analysis
The decoded calldata only exposes two opaque execute() fallback calls on Ethereum (chain 0x1), both indexed as action 0, targeting what appear to be the Ethereum Part 1 and Part 2 payload contracts referenced in the proposal's implementation links. No decoded arguments are provided for either call, and none of the Monad-side actions, the other-network CCIP bucket updates, or the GSM wiring steps (reserve enrollment, role grants, exposure cap, fee strategy) appear as separate decoded actions in this dataset — they are presumably executed by other governance payloads on their respective chains, consistent with the description's multi-chain, multi-part execution plan. Because the calldata we have access to lacks granular decoded arguments (mint amounts, bucket sizes, role addresses, fee parameters), it is not possible to verify or refute the specific numeric and target claims in the description (50M mint, 25M reserve limit, 40M exposure cap, 0%/0.10% fees, role grants, etc.). The high-level structure that is visible — two sequential Ethereum execute() calls — matches the description's stated 'Ethereum Part 1' and 'Part 2' execution order, so nothing in what is observable contradicts the prose. Given the shallow decoding, confidence in this comparison is low, and per guidance we do not surface unverifiable claims as discrepancies; the overall assessment is recorded as consistent based on the limited evidence available.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x1742…d1f2
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- fallback()
- Arguments
{}- Calldata
- Target
- 0xb17f…4018
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- fallback()
- Arguments
{}- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
| Voter | Choice | % of total | Rationale | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 330x3320…3bb7 | for | 107.2K | 28.03% | — | 3mo ago |
| 2C0x2cc1…4df1 | for | 89.2K | 23.32% | — | 3mo ago |
| 8B0x8b37…2a22 | for | 75.9K | 19.85% | — | 3mo ago |
| B90xb933…8dd1 | for | 53.7K | 14.05% | — | 3mo ago |
| 360x3676…574d | for | 25K | 6.53% | — | 3mo ago |
| C00xc0d6…b802 | for | 20.2K | 5.28% | — | 3mo ago |
| 070x0703…961b | for | 10K | 2.61% | — | 3mo ago |
| 9E0x9eba…9eda | for | 969.2 | 0.25% | — | 3mo ago |
| 7F0x7fd5…caaf | for | 164.9 | 0.04% | — | 3mo ago |
| 3D0x3ddc…05b0 | for | 102.4 | 0.03% | — | 3mo ago |
| D00xd0de…eaae | for | 19.1 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| BC0xbcf0…46a5 | against | 7.2 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 080x089a…2dfd | for | 5 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| EB0xeb5f…0794 | for | 4.2 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 6C0x6c2e…3c04 | for | 0.4 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 9A0x9a71…195a | for | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 2F0x2f2f…f78a | for | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 690x6923…26da | for | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 050x05f7…946c | for | 0.2 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 2C0x2c59…bb5e | for | 0.1 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 7C0x7c56…d778 | for | 0.1 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 410x412e…ad54 | for | 0.1 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 7C0x7c4b…8101 | for | 0.1 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| D10xd10f…608c | for | 0.1 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 530x53da…c14b | for | 0 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 260x26d5…141f | against | 0 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| CB0xcb15…a1a0 | for | 0 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
| 4D0x4d4a…1bdf | for | 0 | 0.00% | — | 3mo ago |
07Forum
- [ARFC] Deploy Aave Protocol v3.7 on Monad ↗discourse · high confidence
Arguments for
- Deploying early on Monad lets Aave establish first-mover leadership as the core liquidity layer of a new high-performance EVM ecosystem rather than competing for share later.— TokenLogic, Abel189
- The proposed incentive package ($15M in ecosystem incentives plus 10M GHO acquired/retained by Monad Foundation) represents meaningful alignment and a strong growth catalyst.— TokenLogic, Abel189
- Monad's full EVM bytecode compatibility minimizes integration friction, allowing Aave's existing codebase and Ethereum-native builders to adopt quickly.— TokenLogic, LlamaRisk
- The deployment expands GHO utility and infrastructure (remoteGSM, CCIP lanes, dedicated stewards and reserve) beyond simple TVL growth.— TokenLogic, Abel189
- Extensive independent risk and asset-level due diligence (chain fundamentals, bridge/access-control review, liquidity requirements) supports a conservative, well-informed initial parameter set.— LlamaRisk, AaveLabs
- Because Monad already has a bootstrapped user base and active liquidation flow, enabling Smart Value Recapture (SVR) feeds from day one captures otherwise-forgone recapture revenue.— LlamaRisk
Arguments against
- Monad's short operational history (~7 months at time of review) and marginal/compressing on-chain activity since launch warrant caution about relying on assumed growth.— LlamaRisk
- Monad's novel optimistic parallel execution and its BFT consensus's two-round finality remain relatively untested under adversarial or high-congestion conditions, creating execution/finality risk during liquidation-heavy periods.— LlamaRisk
- On-chain exit liquidity is thin and concentrated in a handful of pools, falling short of the cover ratios needed to support the proposed supply caps and safe liquidations at scale.— LlamaRisk
- Network decentralization and security posture carry risk: no active slashing regime, a small (200-validator) and largely untested set, and upgrade/control authority effectively centralized with Category Labs.— LlamaRisk
- Cross-chain asset rails depend on external bridge/DVN infrastructure (Wormhole, Axelar, LayerZero, CCIP) and several tokens have EOA-controlled critical roles without timelocks, adding operational and custodial risk.— LlamaRisk
- MON tokenomics carry multi-year dilution and unlock overhang risk from large non-circulating insider and ecosystem allocations.— LlamaRisk
Unresolved concerns
- Several proposed assets (e.g., AUSD, USDC, mUSD) have critical roles held by EOAs or lack timelocks, and LlamaRisk flagged it would follow up with issuers but resolution was not confirmed in-thread.— LlamaRisk
- Actual on-chain liquidity for several assets (mUSD, syrupUSDC, USDe/sUSDe, weETH) remains minimal or near-zero relative to proposed supply caps, with stakeholders only indicating liquidity 'will be made available.'— LlamaRisk
- Whether Monad's early activity spike will translate into durable, non-incentive-driven borrow demand and liquidity depth over time remains uncertain.— LlamaRisk
- Dependence on Wormhole/Axelar liveness and security for a meaningful share of asset inflows/outflows introduces an external systemic risk not fully addressed.— LlamaRisk
- Ongoing monitoring needs (liquidity quality, utilization, risk parameters) were flagged as necessary but no concrete follow-up mechanism was specified.— Abel189
Notable participants
- TokenLogicProposal author who authored the ARFC, defined incentive package, asset parameters, and GHO infrastructure specification.
- LlamaRiskIndependent risk reviewer providing extensive network, asset, bridge, access-control, liquidity, and price-feed/SVR analysis across multiple posts.
- AaveLabsReferenced prior technical network assessment, published per-asset technical reviews, and announced AIP creation/voting.
- Abel189Community member expressing explicit support while noting the need for ongoing monitoring.