KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governance v3 · #499

Update USDG Price Feed on Aave V3 Instances

executedJun 28, 2026, 08:23 AM UTCby660x66a2…73ff

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Replace the USDG price feed on Aave V3 Ethereum and X Layer with a price cap adapter (1.04 max) using Chainlink as the underlying source, and apply the same adapter to the expired PT-USDG-28MAY2026 asset.

Type
parameter change

Key changes

  • Replace USDG price feed with price cap adapter on Ethereum Core instance, capping at 1.04 using Chainlink feed 0x14f0737d6b705259e521EA6E9E3506AC78dBd311(high)
  • Replace USDG price feed with price cap adapter on X Layer instance, capping at 1.04 using Chainlink feed 0x385C6bDDE06b0E438319bF4ddBfFe51C521ABf3D(high)
  • Apply price cap adapter to expired PT-USDG-28MAY2026 asset using the same adapter configuration as USDG(medium)

Notable concerns

  • Maturity of PT-USDG-28MAY2026 has expired, requiring price feed adjustment
ContractsAave V3 Oracle (Ethereum)Aave V3 Oracle (X Layer)
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Read the description ↗

02Description

276 words

Simple Summary

Replace the existing USDG price feed on the applicable Aave V3 instances (Ethereum Core and X Layer) with a price cap adapter, set to a maximum price of 1.04 and using the Chainlink USDG feed as the underlying source. The same price adapter must also be used for the PT-USDG-28MAY2026 asset, given that its maturity is now expired.

Motivation

Per LlamaRisk’s latest assessment, liquidity conditions for USDG have improved such that the Chainlink feed now provides higher-quality pricing than the source currently in production. Following the same strategy already applied to other assets across the protocol, the proposal wraps this feed in a price adapter with a cap of 1.04, ensuring the reported price tracks Chainlink while remaining bounded on the upside.

Specification

Upon execution, on each applicable instance the proposal will call setAssetSources([USDG_ADDRESS], [PRICE_CAP_ADAPTER]) on the Aave V3 oracle, pointing USDG at the newly deployed price cap adapter for that network. Each adapter uses the corresponding Chainlink USDG feed as its underlying source and the cap price listed below.

Since the maturity of the PT-USDG-28MAY2026 asset is now expired, the same price adapter must be used as well.

Pamateter (Ethereum)Value
Chainlink Price Feed0x14f0737d6b705259e521EA6E9E3506AC78dBd311
Price Adapter0x83D20dEEdcd4aC1313496c8CBcAad0fa298c0CE4
Price cap1.04
Pamateter (X Layer)Value
Chainlink Price Feed0x385C6bDDE06b0E438319bF4ddBfFe51C521ABf3D
Price Adapter0xe00B2732396a1f047d4A00e0165025A9cF400245
Price cap1.04

References

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorumlow confidenceclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The decoded calldata contains only a single generic execute() call to a payload contract address, which is the typical Aave governance pattern: the granular logic (setAssetSources for USDG on Ethereum and X Layer, and for PT-USDG-28MAY2026) lives inside that payload contract's bytecode and is not exposed in this decoded action list. Because the actual sub-actions (target oracle contracts, specific addresses for the price cap adapters, and the PT-USDG asset update) are not visible in the provided calldata, I cannot directly verify the specific values (price cap of 1.04, adapter addresses, Chainlink feed addresses) claimed in the description against on-chain execution. There is also no visible action for the X Layer instance, though this is consistent with Aave's cross-chain governance design where a single Ethereum-based proposal can trigger execution on other chains via a bridging mechanism, so its absence here is not necessarily an omission by the proposer. Given the opacity of the single execute() action, I am marking confidence as low rather than asserting a discrepancy — there is no evidence contradicting the description, but also no way to fully confirm the specific numeric parameters or target addresses match. Per guidance, low-confidence assessments should not be surfaced as flagged discrepancies, so I report no discrepancies and an overall assessment of consistent, pending manual review of the referenced payload contract's implementation for full verification.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

1 total
#0fallback()chain 0x1
Target
0xe942…81bb
Value
0 wei
Function
fallback()
Arguments
{}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters16
VP participating344K
Outcome (current)For
Current support100%

06Voters

16 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.