Raise sUSDe and USDe November expiry PT tokens caps on Aave V3 Core Instance

The proposal describes two specific risk-parameter changes: raising the sUSDe November PT supply cap to $1.2b and the USDe November PT supply cap to $1b. The decoded on-chain action is a single call to execute() (fallback) on a payload contract address, with no decoded internal arguments. This is the standard pattern for Aave governance proposals, where the actual parameter updates (e.g., calls to a PoolConfigurator or risk-steward contract setting supply caps) are encoded inside the payload contract's bytecode and are not surfaced as separate decoded actions here. Because the decoded calldata does not expose the specific cap values or target markets being modified, I cannot directly verify that the payload matches the $1.2b and $1b figures stated in the description. There is no evidence of a mismatch, but there is also insufficient decoded detail to confirm exact alignment, so confidence is low. No red flags (e.g., unexpected recipients, fund transfers, or role grants) are visible in the single decoded action, and the pattern is consistent with typical, non-malicious Aave ARFC execution structure.