KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governance v3 · #366

Multi eMode Update and Creation - rsETH, ezETH, wstETH and weETH

executedSep 3, 2025, 03:08 PM UTCby570x57ab…2922

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Updates eMode categories on Arbitrum for rsETH and ezETH to include wETH as borrowable asset alongside wstETH, creates new wstETH/wETH eMode on Arbitrum, and creates weETH/wstETH eMode on Core. All changes maintain consistent LTV/liquidation parameters aligned with ETH liquid staking token risk profiles to support upcoming DRIPs campaign.

Type
parameter change

Key changes

  • rsETH eMode on Arbitrum updated to support borrowing wstETH and wETH with 93% LTV and 95% liquidation threshold(high)
  • ezETH eMode on Arbitrum updated to support borrowing wstETH and wETH with 93% LTV and 95% liquidation threshold(high)
  • New wstETH/wETH eMode created on Arbitrum with 94% LTV and 96% liquidation threshold(high)
  • New weETH/wstETH eMode created on Core with 93% LTV and 95% liquidation threshold(high)

Notable concerns

  • High LTV ratios (93-94%) and liquidation thresholds (95-96%) across all eMode categories create elevated liquidation risk during market volatility
  • All eMode categories involve correlated ETH-denominated assets which could amplify systemic risk during ETH price movements
ContractsAave V3 ArbitrumAave V3 Core
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Read the description ↗

02Description

342 words

Summary

This publication proposes updating the ezETH and rsETH eMode categories on Arbitrum, a new wstETH/wETH category on Arbitrum and the creation of weETH <> wstETH eMode on Core.

Motivation

In preparation for the upcoming DRIPs campaign on Arbitrum, this publication proposes enabling Kelp and Renzo Liquid Restaking Tokens (LRTs) access to ETH via existing v3.2 eModes.

Upon implementing this proposal, the weETH e-Mode on Core and rsETH and ezETH e-Modes on Arbitrum will each have the same LTV and LT for borrowing wstETH and ETH.

Given the behavior of market participants and expected growth of borrowing demand for WETH market, we recommend including WETH into the E-Modes for rsETH and ezETH. Additionally, in order to align the risk profiles of LRTs and wstETH we recommend creating the wstETH/WETH E-Mode on Arbitrum and weETH/wstETH E-Mode on Core.

Specification

Update rsETH/WETH eMode on Arbitrum

ParameterValue
CollateralrsETH
BorrowablewstETH, wETH
Max LTV93.00%
Liquidation Threshold95.00%
Liquidation Penalty1.00%

Update ezETH/WETH eMode on Arbitrum

ParameterValue
CollateralezETH
BorrowablewstETH, wETH
Max LTV93.00%
Liquidation Threshold95.00%
Liquidation Penalty1.00%

Create wstETH/WETH eMode on Arbitrum

ParameterValue
CollateralwstETH
BorrowableWETH
Max LTV94.00%
Liquidation Threshold96.00%
Liquidation Penalty1.00%

Create weETH/wstETH eMode on Core

ParameterValue
CollateralweETH
BorrowablewstETH, wETH
Max LTV93.00%
Liquidation Threshold95.00%
Liquidation Penalty1.00%

References

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorumlow confidenceclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The proposal description details four specific eMode configuration changes across Arbitrum and the Ethereum ('Core') market, each with explicit LTV/LT/penalty values. The decoded calldata, however, contains only a single generic action: an execute()/fallback() call to a payload contract on Ethereum mainnet with no decoded arguments. This is consistent with the standard Aave v3 governance pattern, where the on-chain proposal action is a trivial trigger to a pre-audited payload contract (referenced in the proposal's 'Implementation' links) that internally encodes all the parameter changes, including cross-chain execution on Arbitrum via the CrossChainController. Because the calldata does not expose the internal logic of the payload contract, I cannot directly verify that the LTV, LT, and penalty values match the prose, nor confirm the exact Arbitrum-side actions independently. There is no evidence of a mismatch, redirection of funds, or unrelated action - the single action is the expected boilerplate trigger for this proposal type. Given the opacity of the payload's internal calls, confidence is low, but nothing in the visible calldata contradicts the description, so I mark this as consistent rather than flagging an unverifiable discrepancy speculatively.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

1 total
#0fallback()chain 0x1
Target
0x02a0…45b0
Value
0 wei
Function
fallback()
Arguments
{}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters46
VP participating534.4K
Outcome (current)For
Current support100%

06Voters

46 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.