Reduce Reserve Factor on wstETH
01Summary
Reduce wstETH reserve factor to 5% across all Aave V3 networks (Ethereum, Polygon, Optimism, Arbitrum, Base, Gnosis, Scroll) to align with Lido Alliance proposals and enhance the symbiotic relationship between Aave and Lido through improved leveraged staking incentives.
- Type
- parameter change
Key changes
- Reduce wstETH reserve factor to 5% across all Aave V3 networks(high)
Generated by Kvorum
02Description
Simple Summary
For further alignment with the upcoming Lido Alliance proposals, this proposal will reduce the reserve factor for wstETH to 5%.
Motivation
Aave and Lido have historically seen symbiotic growth, with stETH being one of the premier collaterals on Aave and leveraged staking being one of the most profitable use cases for both Aave DAO and Lido users.
As part of the recently passed TEMP CHECK proposal to create an isolated instance for wstETH borrowers, a number of other parameter changes were proposed to align Lido and Aave.
This proposal implements the agreed reserve factor change for wstETH to 5%.
Specification
On all networks, change wstETH Reserve Factor to 5%.
References
- Implementation: AaveV3Ethereum, AaveV3Polygon, AaveV3Optimism, AaveV3Arbitrum, AaveV3Base, AaveV3Gnosis, AaveV3Scroll
- Tests: AaveV3Ethereum, AaveV3Polygon, AaveV3Optimism, AaveV3Arbitrum, AaveV3Base, AaveV3Gnosis, AaveV3Scroll
- Snapshot
- Discussion
Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
03Mismatch analysis
The proposal description details a specific, well-scoped change: reducing the wstETH reserve factor to 5% across seven networks (Ethereum, Polygon, Optimism, Arbitrum, Base, Gnosis, Scroll), consistent with the BGD Labs implementation pattern referenced in the linked GitHub sources for each network. However, the only decoded on-chain action provided is a single call to execute() (decoded as a generic fallback function) on one contract on Ethereum mainnet. This is typical of Aave's cross-chain governance pattern, where a payload contract deployed on L1 encapsulates parameter-setting logic and/or triggers cross-chain messages to update reserve factors on other networks via the CrossChainController. Because the decoded action does not expose any of the underlying function calls, target reserve addresses, or numeric parameters (e.g., the specific 5% = 5e16 value), it is not possible to directly verify from the calldata that the reserve factor is being set to 5% on wstETH, nor that all seven networks are actually updated. There is no evidence of a mismatch — nothing in the calldata contradicts the description — but the calldata's opacity (single execute() call with no decoded arguments) means a rigorous line-by-line verification against the prose is not feasible. Given the absence of any contradicting signal and the well-established pattern this proposal follows, I did not flag any discrepancies, but confidence is marked low since the calldata alone cannot substantiate the specific claims made in the description.
Generated by Kvorum
04Actions
- Target
- 0x17a5…7ce7
- Value
- 0 wei
- Function
- fallback()
- Arguments
{}- Calldata
05Tally
Summed from votes
06Voters
No votes recorded yet.
07Forum
No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.
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