KVORUM
aaveSource: Aave governance v3 · #124

Onboard sUSDe to Aave V3 on Ethereum

executedJun 26, 2024, 05:10 PM UTCby570x57ab…2922

01Summary

AISummary by Kvorumclaude-haiku-4-5

Proposal to add sUSDe (staked Ethena USD) as collateral to Aave V3 on Ethereum with isolation mode enabled, a $40M debt ceiling, 72% LTV, and flashloaning enabled, following prior community consensus.

Type
protocol addition

Key changes

  • Add sUSDe as collateral asset to Aave V3 on Ethereum(high)
  • Configure sUSDe with isolation mode enabled to limit systemic risk(high)
  • Set debt ceiling at $40,000,000 USD for sUSDe borrowing(high)
  • Set loan-to-value (LTV) at 72% and liquidation threshold at 75%(high)
  • Supply cap configured at 85,000,000 sUSDe(medium)
  • Disable borrowing of sUSDe while enabling it as collateral(medium)
  • Enable flashloaning for sUSDe to maintain consistency with other assets(medium)
  • Set liquidation bonus at 8.5% and protocol fee at 10%(medium)

Notable concerns

  • sUSDe borrowing is completely disabled with 0% borrow cap, limiting its utility as a borrowing asset
  • High debt ceiling of $40M combined with isolation mode requires monitoring for concentration risk
  • All borrow rate parameters set to 0%, meaning no yield generation from sUSDe borrowing activity
Contracts0x1d76c5db48dc36381e16cdf17ac5936200474115Aave V3 Ethereum
Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-haiku-4-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-fast-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Read the description ↗

02Description

311 words

Simple Summary

This is an ARFC to seek approval for the addition of sUSDe to Aave V3 on Ethereum, following the consensus reached in the TEMP CHECK and ARFC stage.

Motivation

As discussed in the TEMP CHECK, Ethena's synthetic dollar, USDe, provides a stable crypto-native solution for a cash and carry structured product. The staked version of USDe, sUSDe, earns yield from the protocol and has high potential for strong collateral demand.

Specification

Amendment: opposed to the initial snapshot the aip enables flashloaning to stay consistent with other assets on the network.

The table below illustrates the configured risk parameters for sUSDe

ParameterValue
Isolation Modetrue
BorrowableDISABLED
Collateral Enabledtrue
Supply Cap (sUSDe)85,000,000
Borrow Cap (sUSDe)0
Debt CeilingUSD 40,000,000
LTV72 %
LT75 %
Liquidation Bonus8.5 %
Liquidation Protocol Fee10 %
Reserve Factor20 %
Base Variable Borrow Rate0 %
Variable Slope 10 %
Variable Slope 20 %
Uoptimal90 %
Stable BorrowingDISABLED
Stable Slope10 %
Stable Slope20 %
Base Stable Rate Offset0 %
Stable Rate Excess Offset0 %
Optimal Stable To Total Debt Ratio0 %
FlashloanableENABLED
Siloed BorrowingDISABLED
Borrowable in IsolationDISABLED
Oracle0xb37aE8aBa6C0C1Bf2c509fc06E11aa4AF29B665A

References

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

03Mismatch analysis

AIMismatch analysis by Kvorumlow confidenceclaude-sonnet-5
Consistent

The proposal follows the standard Aave V3 governance pattern: a single generic execute() call to a payload contract that internally performs the actual asset listing configuration (isolation mode, caps, LTV, LT, liquidation parameters, interest rate curve, flashloan flag, oracle, etc.). The decoded calldata provided contains no arguments or sub-calls, so none of the specific numeric parameters claimed in the description (supply cap, debt ceiling, LTV, LT, liquidation bonus, etc.) can be independently verified or contradicted from the data given. This is typical for Aave payload-based proposals where implementation details live in a linked, audited Solidity contract rather than being decodable at the top-level governance call. Because the calldata is opaque (a bare execute() invocation) rather than because the description is unclear, I cannot confirm the parameters match, but I also see no evidence of a mismatch, target redirection, or omitted/extra actions. The description itself is internally consistent, references the implementation and test files, and explicitly calls out the deviation from the original snapshot (enabling flashloans) rather than hiding it. Given the inability to cross-check the specific numeric values against decoded arguments, confidence is low, and no discrepancies are flagged since nothing in the visible calldata contradicts the prose.

Generated by Kvorum
model: claude-sonnet-5
provider: anthropic
profile: anthropic-strong-v1
prompt: v1.0
generated: 2mo ago
Review the decoded actions ↗

04Actions

1 total
#0fallback()chain 0x1
Target
0x1d76…4115
Value
0 wei
Function
fallback()
Arguments
{}
Calldata

05Tally

Summed from votes

Voters0
VP participating0
Outcome (current)—
Current support—

06Voters

0 total

No votes recorded yet.

07Forum

No forum thread is confidently linked to this proposal.